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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KENNETH CLARK RANSON
Petitioner and Appellant
ProSe
vs.

:

Appellate Case No.
20060449-CA

:

MARIANNA DI PAOLO
Respondent and Appellee
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant appeals the Decree of Divorce and denial of his Motion for New Trial.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter under Utah Code
Annotated (Utah Code Ann.) 78-2a-3-2(h).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1) That the trail court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a new trial.
2) That the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for new trial violates Appellant's
constitutional protections of due process and equal protection of the law.
3) That the trail court erred in determining Appellant's financial need by failing to make
any allowance for taxes, including Federal income and Social Security taxes, and Utah
state income taxes.
4) That the trail court erred in determining Appellant's financial need by failing to make
any allowance for: The expense of owning an automobile; The expense of making major
purchases; Or adequate allowance for the expense of clothing, entertainment, or travel.
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5) That the trial court erred in determining Appellant's financial need by making no
allowance for funds for retirement.
6) That the trial court erred by failing to give any consideration to equalizing the parties
standards of living after divorce and failed to make any finding as to the parties standard
of living during marriage.
7) That the trial court erred by failing to make any adjustment in its award of property or
alimony in consideration of the fact that the Appellee's earning capacity had been greatly
enhanced during the marriage by the efforts of both parties.
8) That the trial court erred in finding that the Appellant can earn $32,000 per year
immediately when he has been out of the workforce for 20 years, suffers from significant
health problems, and when his average earnings per year before marriage were $3,230.
9) That the trial court's decree of divorce is based on illegal sexual prejudice.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issues 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) and 9) are questions of law or mixed questions of law
and fact and are reviewed by the Court of Appeals for correctness with no deference
given to the interpretation of the lower court. State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517,518.
Saleh v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 2006 UT 20
The questions of fact in Issue 8) are reviewed by the Court of Appeals under the
clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932. However that portion of the
finding based on an erroneous legal conclusion is reviewed for correctness with no
deference granted to the opinion of the trial court. Saleh v. Farmer's Insurance
Exchange, 2006 UT 20. In reviewing these issues the Court of Appeals must also
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consider the patent sexual prejudice shown by the trial court throughout its ruling. The
effect of this sexual prejudice is a question of law reviewed for correctness with no
deference given to the interpretation of the lower court. State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d
517,518.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
As to the question of the legality and fairness of the trial court's decree, there is a
lengthy tradition in Utah law which holds that the parties to a marriage are entitled to an
equal share of its financial success even if only one of them worked outside the home.
This tradition is made law in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (8), some subsections quoted in
relevant part below:
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living existing at the
time of separation, in determining alimony
(d) The court may under appropriate circumstances attempt to equalize the parties1
standard of living.
(e) If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts
of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in
dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
This statute codifies at least five decades of decisions by Utah's appellate courts.
The authorities cited in the Table of Authorities are only a small fraction of the cases
affirming these principles. However, as concerns equalizing standard of living during
marriage, English v English 565 P.2d 409 (1977) and Higlev v Higlev 676 P.2d 379
(1983) may be taken as authoritative. As concerns the enhancement of one spouse's
3

earning capacity by the efforts of both parties, Martinez v Martinez 818 P.2d 538 (1991)
may be taken as authoritative. As concerns the need to address funds for retirement in an
alimony award, Gardner v Gardner 748 P.2d 1076(1988) is authoritative, and as concerns
the need to address retirement savings, Bakanowski v Bakanowski 80 P.3d 153 (2003)js
authoritative.
As concerns the question of a new trial, Maltbv v. Cox Construction Utah 598
P,2d 336 (1979)is authoritative concerning the applicability to civil cases, State v. Lopez
886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (1994) is authoritative in applying the standards of Strickland v.
Washington 466 U.S.668 (1984) to cases brought under Utah state law.
As to the question of sexual discrimination The Constitution of the United States,
Amendments V and XIV, is authoritative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties in this case were married for 20 years. They moved to Utah so that
Ms. Di Paolo could pursue a career as a professor of Linguistics at the University of
Utah. By mutual agreement of the parties Mr. Ranson worked in the home, keeping
house, caring for their child, managing their investments, and supporting Ms. Di Paolo's
career. During the marriage Ms. Di Paolo completed her dissertation and received her
PhD., paid her student loans from marital funds, was fired from her position and restored
to it as a result of a tenure appeal authored by Mr. Ranson, and went on to become one of
the most successful women administrators at the University. During the marriage her
salary went from $ 17,000 to $78,000 per year.
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Mr. Ranson contributed to the success of the marriage in the following ways. In
the early years of the marriage he designed, built with his own hands, and primarily paid
for with the use of the money his parents had given him to pay for a college education,
the parties home. As a result of the ownership of this home the parties could afford, in
the early years of the marriage, to live off of Ms. Di Paolo's very low salary and, in the
later years of the marriage, to amass substantial savings.
When Mr. Ranson indicated that he wanted to have children Ms. Di Paolo agreed,
but only on condition that he stay home and care for the child so that she could pursue
her career. To this Mr. Ranson agreed. As a result he fulfilled all the duties of primary
care giver for their son including, dressing and bathing the child, organizing his daily
schedule, choosing day care providers and schools, and fulfilling volunteer requirements
at those schools. Mr. Ranson also fulfilled all of the duties of homemaker, including
cleaning, marketing, and routinely preparing 21 nutritious meals from scratch each week.
In addition Mr. Ranson was actively involved in Ms. Di Paolo career. When Ms.
Di Paolo was terminated from the University Mr. Ranson conducted an appeal. He
reviewed University Policies and Procedures, contacted professional organizations,
arranged for expert witnesses, and authored up to 50 pages of analytic writing per month
for 14 months, Ms. Di Paolo signed this writing and submitted it as her response in the
appeal. As a result of this appeal, Ms. Di Paolo was restored to her position at the
University. This is the only example of a successful tenure appeal at the University of
Utah within memory.

5

Mr. Ranson acted as unpaid research assistant on Ms. Di Paolo's scholarly work.
He wrote an extensive article on Utah ethnicity which was used without citation by Ms.
Di Paolo in her published work. He also collected and analyzed data, prepared research
materials, and helped to administer tests of linguistic perception.
Mr. Ranson wrote Ms. Di Paolo's second tenure review which she signed and
submitted as she had the appeal, and which resulted in the award of tenure to her. Mr.
Ranson wrote Ms. Di Paolo's Year's Work forms. He conducted a job search on her
behalf and he researched and wrote a memo which argued that her salary was
unacceptably low due to sexual discrimination. Each of the above actions resulted in
Ms. Di Paolo receiving substantial increases in salary.
When it became necessary for him to seek a divorce, Mr. Ranson contacted 19
members of the Utah Bar who specialize in family law. None of them would agree to
represent him if he, a man, intended to seek alimony. Many of them made sexist
comments to the effect that he could receive alimony if he were a woman but that this
would not be appropriate because he was a man.
Finally Bridget Romano agreed to take his case and to seek alimony. However,
either through incompetence or deliberate fraud, Ms. Romano failed to research and
prepare anything approaching an adequate case on his behalf. In spite of having
virtually unlimited time and resources she failed to investigate information necessary to
his case, withheld crucial information she did possess from the court, and misrepresented
her actions to Mr. Ranson.
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The trial court deliberated for ten minutes before returning a massively flawed
verdict in this matter. The trail court failed to make any allowance for payroll taxes in

required by statue to consider: the standard of living during marriage, the need to
equalize standards of living after divorce, and the great enhancement of Ms. Di Paolo's
earning capacity during the marriage. The ti ial com t foi md that I\ li R anson con ild
immediateh

1 $32,000 per year when his average earnings in his most productive

years before marriage were $3,200.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. rhe pai ties wei e man led. on February 28, 1986 in Salt Lake County, Utah.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^[2, Index on Appeal 520-3)
2. The decree of Divorce was entered February 10, 2006. (Decree of Divorce,
Index on t appeal 534 12)
4. Before and during the marriage Mr. Ranson, purchased the lot for, built, and in
largest part paid for a house. (Trial Transcript, 70, 71-89; Index on Appeal 842,
Petilionn'\s I\\liibif \ \\u\c*« <m \(i(H/;il 44S> IVtifiontT's l;\Lilii( 4 \m\% \ on Appeal 445,
Petitioner's Exhibit 5, Index on Appeal 445, Petitioner's Exhibit 6, Index on Appeal 445,
Petitioner's Exhibit 7, Index on A ppeal ^45^
5 riiepai ties ha ve one child,, SeanR anson, boi ii Decen iber 2, 1987 (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, f4, Index on Appeal 520-3)
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6. Ms. Di Paolo insisted that if they were to have a child Mr. Ranson would have
to stay home and care for the child so that her career would not be interrupted. (Trial
Transcript 91-93, Index on Appeal 842)
7. Mr. Ranson was the primary care giver of the parties' son and performed all of
the duties of a stay at home spouse. (Trial Transcript 105, Index on Appeal 842)
8. At the beginning of the marriage Ms. Di Paolo's salary was $17,000 per year.
(Trial Transcript 67, Index on Appeal 842)
9. After Ms. Di Paolo was terminated from her position at the University of Utah
Mr. Ranson conducted an appeal on her behalf which resulted in Ms. Di Paolo being
given an extension of 2 years in which to obtain tenure. (Trial Transcript 93-98, 112-114,
Index on Appeal 842, Petitioner's Exhibit 8, Index on Appeal 445)
10. To increase Ms. Di Paolo's salary Mr. Ranson prepared Ms. Di Paolo Year's
Work forms for her signature. (Trial Transcript 115-118, Index on Appeal 842,
Petitioner's Exhibit 9, Index on Appeal 445)
11. Mr. Ranson worked extensively as an unpaid assistant on Ms. Di Paolo's
scholarly research. (Trial Transcript 98-100, 118-119, Index on Appeal 842, Petitioner's
Exhibit 10, Index on Appeal 445)
12. In 1990 Mr. Ranson prepared Ms. Di Paolo responses for her second tenure
review which resulted in her being granted tenure. (Trial Transcript 101, Index on
Appeal 842)
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13. To increase Ms. Di Paolo's salary further, Mr. Ranson organized a job search
on her behalf (Trial Transcript 102-103, 119 121, Index on Appeal 842, Petitioner's
Exhibit 11, Index on Appeal \< 15)
14. To obtain salary equity for Ms. Di Paolo, Mr. Ranson prepared a case
demonstrating salary inequity based on sexual discrimination against her, (Trial
Transcript 101, 103 10 1, In lex on Appeal
15. At the time of trial Ms. Di Paolo earned $78,300 per year. (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, ^fl6, Index on Appeal 520-3)
ip

h
ii

•'

'

tri«1 court foi md that I\ Is. Di I *aolo has the ability to pay $2,500 per

* • '

I 'indings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 'ljj535 Index on Appeal 520-

3)
^ fria1 court deliberated for less than 10 minutes before arriving at its

1
deci- .'

• •*

Di I (ac lo, Videotape 8/29 05, Not inde: ;:ed ) (' The I lonoi a ble Ji idge

Fratto rises from the bench at 12:03PM and returns at 12:17PM. Allowing a conservative
5 minutes to walk to and from his office on the floor below leaves 9 minutes for
deliberation,)
18. The trial court failed to allow for payroll taxes in calculating Mr. Ranson's
needs. In spite of the fact that Ms. Di Paolo's own exhibit does this and in spite of the

Index on Appeal 845, Respondent's Exhibit 29, Index on Appeal 447)
19, The trial court made no finding as to the standard of living during marriage,
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its failure to do so. The court gave no consideration to equalizing the parties' standards
of living after divorce and made no statement as to why it failed to do so. The court gave
no consideration to the great enhancement of Ms. Di Paolo's earning capacity during the
marriage due to the efforts of both spouses, and made no statement as to why it failed to
do so. (Trial Transcript 616-629, Index on Appeal 845)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The overwhelming weight of precedent in Utah law holds that in a marriage of
long duration, when the marriage has enjoyed financial success as a result of the efforts
of both parties, the parties are entitled to equal standards of living after the marriage,
even if only one of them worked outside the home. This tradition supercedes the
previous standard that alimony was adequate if it kept the recipient spouse from
becoming a public charge, and applies even if the recipient spouse could subsist without
alimony. This tradition is supported by the equitable principle that it would be unfair for
a spouse who sacrifices career development and earning capacity so that the marriage
may prosper as a joint venture, to be made to suffer for that decision at divorce. This
tradition was finally codified in statute in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (8), which requires
trial courts to consider this factor in rendering a decision in a divorce.
The trial court in this matter gave absolutely no consideration to the parties'
standard of living during marriage, or the need to equalize that standard of living, in its
decision. It instead ruled that Mr. Ranson could live on less than half of his expenses
during marriage. This ruling placed him in the position of having to spend down marital
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assets immediately to survive, while hisformerwife has tens of thousands of dollars per
year in disposable income.
There is an eq\ iall> sti ong traditioi 1 in I ] tali lav\ that w he n one party to amai riage
has enjoyed a substantial increase in earning capacity due to the efforts of both parties,
the court will consider this in dividing property and awarding alimony. In this case, as
described above, }vu. r .in son was of crucial help to I"\ Is Di I 'aolo's career, both as
liojiicinakcr nnd pi unary cmv giver to their child, and in saving her job and providing
direct assistance to her work. The trial court again gave absolutely no consideration to
this in its ruling.
Indeed, the tria 1 coi u t deliberat 2d for less than ten mini ites in this matter before
returning a massively flawed decision. The trial court was only able to deny Mr. Ranson
alimony by failing to subtract federal and state payroll taxes from its accepted level of his
gross '•. ••-T"*

•• -

k\l In omsifkT, in asscssiii;1, Mr. Riuu n n \ ncmh ; ^

r

allowance for the ownership costs of a car, for the purchase of major appliances, adequate
amounts for the purchase of clothes or travel, or any allowance whatsoever for

purchased the parties' home from Ms. Di Paolo with his share of their retirement funds.
The court must allow him either a large sum of money for retirement or a large sum for
housing, li e.iiuiwl, 111 fnsl»n\ deduct Ixilh.
The trial court found that Mr. Ranson could earn $32,000 per year immediately
with no retraining. This amount is 10 times his average earnings in his most productive
years before marriage, In reaching this decision the ti ial coi 11 t relied on the testimony of

Kristy Farnsworth. This testimony was deliberately misleading in that it conflated
accurate data with personal opinion and rank hyperbole. Stripped of its inaccuracies this
testimony confirms that Mr. Ranson can earn $20,800 per year, which is the figure he
stipulated to, and is what he in fact earns.
As concerns the appeal of the denial of Motion for New Trial, the trial court ruled
that no legal basis exists to grant a new trial in civil matters. In so ruling it relied on a
memo from Ms. Di Paolo's counsel, which deliberately misquotes the relevant precedent.
This memo cites only the minority opinion and deliberately ends the citation just before
the diametrically opposed, and precedential, majority opinion. Utah law requires, in fact,
that civil litigants have the same right to new trails as criminal litigants, in conformity
with the two-pronged test of Strickland. This case meets both of those prongs
abundantly. The facts show that in spite of having time and resources, and repeatedly
assuring him that she would do so, Mr. Ranson's counsel made no investigation of three
crucial issues. The facts also show that she withheld from the trail court, apparently
deliberately, crucial information which she had assured Mr. Ranson she would present.
This meets abundantly the first prong of the test. The trail court itself identifies two of
these items as crucial to its decision. This meets conclusively the second prong.
If this court fails to grant Mr. Ranson a new trail, or to do justice on the available
facts, it will be sanctioning a novel method for denying him due process of law and equal
protection of the law.
There is further substantial evidence that the inequities and irregularities in this
matter are the result of sexual prejudice.
12

Argument
[

The Trial Court's Denial of Appellant's Motion for New Trial was based on
Deliberate Miscitation and Misapplication of Applicable Law. Definitive Evidence
Supports the Requirement of a New Trial in Accordance with Established Precedent
In Maltfry v. Cox. Construction, Utah 598 P,2d 336 (1979) then Chief Justice
Crockett resoundingly rejected the idea that while ineffective assistance of counsel
provided grounds for a new ti ial in criminal ca ses it did not d :) so in : i\ II cases. In his
majority opinion Chief Justice Crockett said, in relevant part:

The main opinion stresses the thought that while incompetence of counsel
may be a ground for nullifying a judgment in a criminal case, it has not
been done and therefore should not be done in a civil case. The statement
seems too broad and inclusive. The purpose of all court proceedings is, of
course, to do justice. If the processes have so clearly gone awry that an
injustice has resulted, the court in charge of the trial, or this court on
review, should rectify such an unfortunate occurrence, whether the
proceeding is civil or criminal.
In so saying, I am aware that it is generally said that mistake, error of
judgment, or negligence of counsel in presenting or defending a case is not
sufficient cause of vacating a judgment and granting a new trial. However,
consistent with the principle stated above, it has been held that under
exigent circumstances, incompetence or negligence of counsel which
appears to have resulted in an injustice, will justify the granting of a new
trial. It is therefore my view that in determining whether relief should be
granted the matter of critical concern should not be as to the nature of the
proceeding, but whether there is such a strong likelihood that an injustice
has resulted that good conscience requires that it be remedied.
r

I lie Petitioner and i appellant, hereaftei refei red to a s I\ lr. f! anson, is therefore fi illy

entitled to request a new trial in this civil matter on the same terms as if it were a criminal
case.
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In State v. Lopez 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (1994) Justice Howe, writing for a
unanimous Utah Supreme Court, accepts in determining effective assistance of counsel
the two pronged test advanced in Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S.668 (1984). "The
first prong of the test requires the defendant to show that counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." "The second prong
requires the defendant to show that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
In Utah v Templin 805 P.2d 182 (1990) then Chief Justice Hall applies these tests
to facts that closely parallel this case. As concerns the first prong of the test he says for a
unanimous Utah Supreme Court:

If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case,
including the availability of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's
performance cannot fall within the "wide range of reasonable professional
assistance." This is because a decision not to investigate cannot be
considered a tactical decision. It is only after an adequate inquiry has been
made that counsel can make a reasonable decision to call or not call a
particular witness for tactical reasons. Therefore, because defendant's trial
counsel did not make a reasonable investigation into the possibility of
procuring prospective witnesses, the first part of the Strickland test has
been met.
Justice Hall also notes that Templin's counsel had adequate time and resources to prepare
his case, having been hired almost a year before trial and charging Templin $9,000.
In this case Mr. Ranson's counsel, Bridget Romano, failed to present at trial
numerous pieces of evidence which would have strengthened his case, of these four were
crucial: 1) Evidence of Mr. Ranson's continuing serous health problems, 2) Testimony of
an employment counselor as to Mr. Ranson's current earning ability, 3) Evidence that
Mr. Ranson's average earnings per year before marriage were $3,230, 4) Evidence of the
14

parties actual expenses during marriage. The first three of these involve decisions not to
investigate and so specifically meet the first prong of the Strickland test as established by
the Templin pi ecedent In the case of the foi 11 tit,, after i epeatedly assuring 1\ Ir. R anson
that she would present this information at trial, Ms. Romano unilaterally and without
informing Mr. Ranson failed to do so.
Tvi.. i ,inson retained I\ Is. R omano in September, 200 4 ' I rial in this matter

(

as

held August 16, 2005. Ms. Romano then had nearly 1 year to prepare a case. She
charged Mr. Ranson over $30,000 in fees. Mr. Ranson supplied her with every piece of
information she ask./ ,iiro for Tn spite of ; :iis Ms, Romano failed utterly to prepare an
affirmal
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Numerous memoranda and emails document Ms. Romano failure to prepare a
case. Space permits reference to only a few crucial ones here. At a meeting on
November 2(), IDiH Mr, R;mson JJ:
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wished to pursue it. (A copy of this inaiio ia included as Addendum A I, Index on
Appeal 558-63) In this memo he specifically asked Ms. Romano to subpoena his personal

the steps necessary to make a case for him to receive alimony sufficient to equalize the
parties incomes, and asked if he should see an employment counselor. On that same date,
atlei Ihrir nnvhni1, Mi Riinsoii prepared w memo

HIJMJUI^

tlml he should n.,i( Mibnnl an

expense statement based on his expenses during separation but instead on his expenses
during the marriage so as to reflect the standard of living at that time (A copy of this
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this brief. Mr. Ranson moved for permission to present them but was denied.) Ms.
Romano did not object to any of these points and instead assured Mr. Ranson that she
would pursue the evidence he had cited. Mr. Ranson then prepared a statement of his
expenses during the marriage and this was used by Ms. Romano during mediation
(Addendum A-2).
On March 17, 2005 Mr. Ranson spoke to Dr. Barton and found he was adamantly
opposed to testifying in court. Mr. Ranson promptly informed Ms. Romano of this. On
April 5, 2005 Ms. Romano suggested that she prepare a written settlement offer
(Addendum A-3, Index on Appeal 578). For the next two months Mr. Ranson invested
many hours a week in supplying information for this offer. This process generated many
thousands of dollars in fees for Ms. Romano and her firm. On April 22, 2005 Ms.
Romano thanked Mr. Ranson for his work on this matter and said that she would now
prepare a written settlement offer. Mr. Ranson continued to supply information to Ms.
Romano's office until May 24, 2005. Mr. Ranson heard nothing further from Ms.
Romano until July 18, 2005. On that date she sent him an email which showed that she
had not prepared a written settlement offer and had in fact forgotten completely about his
case and all of the information he had paid her thousands of dollars to familiarize herself
with (Addendum A-4, Index on Appeal 581).
There were now 13 days left in which Ms. Romano could issue subpoenas and
submit a witness list. She assured Mr. Ranson that she would get to work on his case
immediately. She did not. When Mr. Ranson met with Ms. Romano on July 26, 2005 she
had still done nothing on his case. However, she assured him again that she would.
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When Mr. Ranson contacted Ms. Romano's office on July 28, 2005 he discovered that
instead of working on his case she had gone to San Francisco on vacation. In an email on
that same date Mr. Ranson implored Ms. Romano to obtain testimony from an
employment counselor. She in fact gave him the name of such a counselor but indicated
that he would be acting entirely on his own when he consulted her. On August 1, 2005
the deadline for adding names to the witness list passed and Ms. Romano did not add the
name of the employment counselor
On August 3, 2005 Ms. Romano spoke to Dr. Lewis Barton for the first time, nine
months after Mr. Ranson had first asked her to contact to him. She discovered, as Mr.
Ranson had told her in March, that Dr. Barton was unwilling to testify. Mr. Ranson then
provided Ms. Romano with the names of other physicians who were familiar with his
medical history and could testify on his behalf Ms. Romano stated that it was too late to
add names to the witness list and told Mr. Ranson that it was his fault his medical records
could not now be introduced at trial (Addendum A-5, Index on Appeal 594-6).
On August 4, 2005 Ms. Romano asked Mr. Ranson to prepare a detailed statement
of his expenses during separation. Mr. Ranson replied that he thought it essential that his
expenses during marriage be used. He sent Ms. Romano a memo citing Gardner v
Gardner 748 P.2d 1076(1988), Martinez v Martinez 818 P.2d 538 (1991), and Dunnv
Dunn 802 P.2d 1314 (1990), to emphasize this. Ms. Romano replied that she had these
cases in his case file. This assured Mr. Ranson that she intended to pursue the line of
argument he had set out. In fact, without Mr. Ranson's knowledge or consent, Ms.
Romano deliberately withheld his statement of expenses during marriage from the court,
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and submitted as his sole statement of expenses, the statement of expenses during
separation which she had compelled him to prepare.
On August 5, 2005 Ms. Romano again stopped preparation for trial saying she
preferred to pursue negotiation with the Respondent and Appellee, hereafter referred to as
Ms. Di Paolo. It was only on August 12, 2005 that Ms. Romano informed Mr. Ranson
that she was again "scrambling" to prepare his case (Addendum A-6). As a result Mr.
Ranson never saw the exhibits which had been prepared for his own trial except such of
them as were handed to him on the witness stand. This is why he was unaware his
expense statement had been changed.
As a further result of this "scrambling" Ms. Romano never discussed with Mr.
Ranson his own testimony, which was now almost his sole case. Thus when Ms. Di
Paolo's counsel asked Mr. Ranson on the witness stand how much he had earned before
the parties were married, Mr. Ranson was surprised by the question. No one had told him
that this information might be important and he answered , based on his recollection of
events 30 years prior, that he might have made as much as $25,000 per year. In fact Mr.
Ranson5s Social Security records show that his average earnings in his most productive
years before marriage were $3,230 per year. ( A copy of Mr. Ranson's Social Security
earnings statement is included as Addendum A-7).
These facts clearly support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ms.
Romano completely failed to make any investigation of Mr. Ranson's medical history, or
witnesses who could testify to it, until it was too late to have that information presented at
trial. Ms. Romano refused to make any investigation of Mr. Ranson's current
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employ ability. Ms. Romano failed to make any investigation of Mr. Ranson's
employment and earnings history. As per Utah v Templin, supra, these are not debatable
tactical decisions. Because Ms. Romano made no investigation of them whatsoever she
could not reasonably conclude that the information was not crucial to her client's case. In
spite of having represented Mr. Ranson for nearly a year before trial, and in spite of
eventually charging him over $30,000 in fees, Ms. Romano was never quite able to find
time to prepare a case on is behalf.
As to her failure to present his expenses during marriage an even more serous
conclusion emerges. Mr. Ranson and Ms. Romano discussed repeatedly the need for him
to obtain alimony in an amount which, when combined with what he could earn, would
allow him to maintain the standard of living he had during the marriage. In his email of
August 4, 2005, Mr. Ranson gave the specifics of the cases supporting such an award and
Ms. Romano, in her reply, assured him that they were "in his file." Then when Ms.
Romano presented that file to the court she deliberately, and without informing Mr.
Ranson, removed those expenses and never presented them to the court. The simplest
explanation for this is that Ms. Romano did not believe that Mr. Ranson should receive
alimony and deliberately removed the evidence that supported his claim so as to prevent
him from doing so.
The second prong of the Strickland test is usually the most difficult to meet as the
party seeking a new trial must show that their counsel's incompetent conduct prejudiced
the result. In this case however that fact is stated specifically by the decider of fact. In
its ruling from the bench the trial court states:
19

I think I need to make this finding from the evidence that's been presented
at this trail and to a preponderance of that evidence...I find that the
petitioner is able to.. .enjoy.. .an income of $32,000 a year.. .1 base that on
the testimony and the evidence that I have which is the testimony of the
Witness Farnsworth. The petitioner responds with an opinion that his age
prohibits that but I quite frankly don't have much evidence to that,
competent evidence to that proposition. In fact, the expert in the subject
opined to the contrary. (Trial Transcript 623-4)
As concerns Mr. Ranson's health problems the court says:
The other factor advanced was health considerations and this was the
petitioner's opinion in terms of both what he suffers from and how it would
impact the kind of employment that the Witness Farnsworth would opine
that he's eligible to obtain. These include the optic migraine episodes.. .but
I'm not convinced from the evidence that that condition or any of the other
conditions to which Mr. Ranson suffers adversely affects the ability to
obtain employment of $32,000 per year. (Transcript 624)
Here the court states specifically that it does not have competent evidence on two
propositions which it finds crucial to its decision against Mr. Ranson. As shown above,
Mr. Ranson had been imploring his attorney for at least the last 9 months to produce
exactly that evidence. She repeatedly assured him she would do so. In fact she never
made any attempt to do so until, by her own admission, it was too late. Since the court
itself identifies as crucial to its adverse ruling the absence of two of pieces of evidence
which were not presented solely due to the ineffective assistance of Mr. Ranson's
counsel, the second prong of the Strickland test is clearly met.
There is also a reasonably probability that if the court had been presented Mr.
Ranson's Social Security earnings history, and known that in his most productive period
his earnings averaged $3,230 per year, it would not have found that he was capable of
earning $32,000 per year immediately.
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There is also a reasonable probability that if the court had been presented Mr.
Ranson's accurate statement of his expenses during marriage, which showed those
expenses as $3,400 per month, which does not include the $450 which the court allowed
for his purchase of comparable health insurance, or any allowance for rent or retirement,
that the court would not have found that Mr. Ranson's needs were only $2,500 per
month. Clearly the deliberate suppression of this information by Ms. Romano was also
crucial to the decision of the court.
In his response to Mr. Ranson's Motion for a New Trial, Ms. Di Paolo's counsel,
Robert Pusey, argued that no legal basis exists to seek a new trial in a civil matter on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Memorandum in Opposition, ^[5, Index on
Appeal 604-10, Addendum A-8). Mr. Pusey cites Maltbv v Cox, supra, as his authority
for this. However he quotes only the MINORITY opinion, stopping just above the
MAJORITY opinion, which was cited at length above. As shown, this majority opinion
resoundingly rejects the minority opinion and sets as the standard for the State of Utah
the precedent that civil litigants are just as entitled as criminal litigants to new trials, and
on the same grounds.
Since in all copies of the opinion that Mr. Ranson has seen, the minority opinion is
directly above the majority opinion, the most logical explanation for Mr. Pusey's claim is
that he was deliberately trying to mislead the court. The court relied on this false
information in its denial of Mr. Ranson's Motion for New Trial saying, "The legal
concept of ineffective assistance of counsel, as a basis to either reverse a decision or
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mandate a new trial, is applicable only in criminal cases" (Minute Entry April 11, 2006,
Index on Appeal 638-9, Addendum A-9).
As then Chief Justice Hall points out in Utah v Templin, Supra, questions of
ineffective assistance of counsel present mixed questions of fact and law, as a result,
"reviewing courts are free to make an independent determination of a trial court's
conclusions." Therefore this court is free to remedy the false reading of the law
promoted by Ms. Di Paolo's counsel and to grant Mr. Ranson a new trial.
I

IF THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILS TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL IT WILL BE
SANCTIONING A NOVEL METHOD FOR CIRCUMVENTING THE
GUARANTEES OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW.
In attempting to find counsel to represent him Mr. Ranson contacted 19 members
of the Utah Bar who specialize in divorce law (A table containing specifics has been
omitted due to length.). Not one of them would agree to take a case in which a man
sought alimony. In refusing, many of them made comments which indicated sexual
prejudice including: 'he would receive alimony if he were a woman in the same
circumstances but could not receive alimony because he was a man/ 'he was lazy and
had been living off of his wife/ 'an arbiter would beat sense into him'. It was for this
reason that Mr. Ranson was forced to rely on Ms. Romano. She was the only attorney he
contacted who would agree to seek alimony on his behalf. However, as can be seen from
the above, her efforts were at best incompetent and at worst fraudulent.
If this court refuses to grant Mr. Ranson a new trial it will be sanctioning a novel,
extralegal method for circumventing the due process and equal protection clauses of the
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U.S. Constitution. Under the law, when someone has been the victim of illegal prejudice
they can take the offending party to court and receive relief. But in this case we are
confronted with a situation where a large body of attorneys all share the same societal
prejudice. As a result they refuse to represent the victim of discrimination. Eventually
one of their number does agree to represent him, but fails to place crucial evidence before
the court, so that the discriminated person is unable to obtain relief. It is then, of course,
impossible for the appellate courts to provide relief since the crucial information is not
part of the record. If this court fails to grant a new trail in this matter, or to grant Mr.
Ranson equality under the law on the extant record, it will be ratifying this method of
"discrimination by attorney" and placing it beyond the reach of the law.
When Mr. Ranson's case is seen as it is in fact, his contributions to his marriage,
his health, his earnings history, his standard of living during marriage, it is irrefutable. It
is only the incompetence, possibly deliberate, of his counsel that gives any pretense of
defensibility to the actions of the trial court. To fail to require the trail court to reopen
this matter would be to countenance a grotesque act of sexual discrimination.
THE TRIAL COURT MADE EGREGIOUS ERRORS IN DETERMINING
PETITIONER'S FINANCIAL NEED
After a trial which took place over parts of four days the court deliberated for less
than ten minutes before delivering its ruling. This ruling was massively flawed,
contained egregious errors of fact, and failed to consider essential points of law.
A. The trial court failed to subtract federal and state payroll and income
taxes from Mr. Ranson's earnings in determining his income.
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In determining Mr. Ranson5s earning ability the trail court found that he could
earn $32,000 per year. This is equivalent to $2,666 per month. The court then
determined that Mr. Ranson's financial need was $2,500 per month. The trail court then
concluded that Mr. Ranson had the ability to earn more than his needs.
This conclusion however completely ignores federal and state income and payroll
taxes. In Ms. Di Paolo's Exhibit 29 the witness Diana Castell specifically considered this
and found that on an income of $32,864 Mr. Ranson's net monthly income would be
$2,117.42 (Index on Appeal 447, Addendum C-l). Using the court's figure of an annual
income of $32,000 the net monthly income would be $2,071.83 (Calculation omitted due
to length). This figure is $428.17 less than the need arrived at by the court.
Thus even if we accept, in arguendo, the ridiculously high earnings figure of the
court, accept also the ridiculously low need, and accept the complete failure of the court
to consider any of the statutorily required factors for determining alimony, the minimum
alimony award to Mr. Ranson should be not $0 but $428 per month, for a period equal to
the 20 years of the marriage. This failure of the trial court is plain error.

B. The trial court failed to make any allowance for the ownership costs of an
automobile, for major purchases such as furniture or appliances, or to
make adequate allowance for clothing or travel.
The trial court arrives at its determination of Mr. Ranson's need by taking the
calculation of his expenses during separation (Addendum C-2, Index on Appeal 445),
which Ms. Romano submitted without Mr. Ranson5s knowledge, and deducting from
them what it terms "one time expenses" and living expenses for his son, Sean. The

24

resulting expense calculation is clearly not adequate to meet Mr. Ranson's needs. It
contains no allowance for the ownership costs of an automobile, for major purchases such
as appliances or furniture, or remotely adequate allowances for clothing or travel. At the
time the expenses during separation were incurred Mr. Ranson was desperately
attempting to both attend college and to raise enough money to pay his attorneys. Since
he had no access to his savings he was forced to borrow money to live. Naturally he
deferred purchases which would be a normal part of an American household budget.
As Mr. Ranson testified at trial the automobile expense listed is just enough for
gas and repairs on a 14 year old car. If Mr. Ranson were to purchase a car the equivalent
of the one Ms. Di Paolo received in the property settlement, which then had a value of
$22,000, and if he were to obtain a 5-year car loan at 5.25% interest, this would require a
monthly payment of approximately $450.
Even if this court rejects Mr. Ranson's argument that he should be able to
maintain the standard of living during the marriage, it is not reasonable to expect that he
would be able to live without purchasing a car, appliances, furniture, or clothing If any
reasonable allowance is made for these purchases, the minimum amount of alimony Mr.
Ranson should receive increases from $428 to more than $1,000 per month. The failure
of the trial court to include basic necessities in its analysis of Mr. Ranson's need is clear
and prejudicial error.

THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO PROVISION FOR FUNDS FOR RETIREMENT
IN DETERMINING PETITIONER'S NEED AND MADE NO FINDING AS TO
WHY IT FAILED TO DO SO
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During the marriage Mr. Ranson paid for and built a house which the parties
owned without encumbrance. The parties also made regular contributions to a retirement
account, 25 times a year, automatically, from every paycheck, every year, for 20 years.
During settlement negotiations Ms. Romano insisted that Mr. Ranson purchase Ms. Di
Paolo's interest in the home in return for an equal dollar amount of their retirement
account. For this reason no need for rent or mortgage appears in Mr. Ranson's expenses,
a fact crucial to the trial court's denial of alimony. However, Mr. Ranson now has a large
need for retirement funds, a need which the trial court gave no consideration in its ruling.
At this time Mr. Ranson is 55 years old which means he is 9 1/4 years from
retirement age. He has approximately $42,000 in retirement savings. After taxes and
legal fees he has $46,000 in other savings. Because he remained home to support Ms. Di
Paolo's career and to raise their son, Mr. Ranson is not qualified for Social Security
benefits. If we accept the unreasonably high finding of the trial court and assume Mr.
Ranson can earn $32,000 immediately and every year until retirement, Mr. Ranson will
be eligible for $685 in social security retirement benefits (Calculation omitted due to
length). If we assume that Mr. Ranson can retire on 70% of his court allowed $32,000
income, he will have a need for retirement savings of $2,800 per month to retire at age 65
(Omitted due to length). This example of course does not explain why Mr. Ranson
should be living on $22,400 a year in retirement while Ms. Di Paolo will be living on an
income over three times as large.
In Gardner v Gardner, supra, the Utah Supreme Court considered the question of
the need for alimony in retirement. It overturned the alimony award of the trial court and
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remanded for further proceedings in part because the trail court's award of alimony "is
insufficient to equalize the parties standard of living following.. .retirement."
In Bakanowski v Bakanowski 80 P.3d 153 (2003) this court addressed the issue of
whether the present need to save for future retirement could ever be a part of an alimony
determination. It found that, "The critical question is whether funds for post-divorce
savings, investment, and retirement accounts are necessary because contributing to such
accounts was standard practice during the marriage and helped form the couple's marital
standard of living." In the present case that requirement is abundantly met.
At trial Mr. Ranson testified several times to his need for alimony to provide funds
for retirement (Transcript 132, 149, 196). In spite of this the court made no finding
concerning this issue and made no provision for retirement savings or equal standards of
living after retirement in its consideration of alimony. This is clear and prejudicial error.
V

THE TRIAL COURT GAVE NO CONSIDERATION TO THE STANDARD OF
LIVING DURING THE MARRIAGE IN DETERMINING PETITIONER'S NEED
AND MADE NO FINDING AS TO WHY IT FAILED TO DO SO
Utah Code §3-3-5(8)(c) states that, "as a general rule, the court should look to the
standard of living existing at the time of separation in determining alimony." It allows
the court to base alimony on the standard of living at the time of trial if this is supported
by "equitable principles." In this case the trial court based its decision solely on the
standard of living at the time of trial, gave no consideration to the standard of living
during marriage, and made absolutely no mention of its reasons for doing so.
The overwhelming weight of precedent in Utah law requires alimony to be based
on the standard of living that existed during the marriage. This tradition began with
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MacDonald v Macdonald 236 P.2d 1066(1951) in which the Utah Supreme Court
disposed of the previous tradition that alimony was adequate if it prevented the wife [sic]
from becoming a public charge and found instead that divorced parties are entitled to be
provided for according to their "station in life".
By the time of English v English 565 P.2d 409 (1977) our supreme court, citing its
own previous opinion, stated with absolute clarity:
the most important function of alimony is to provide support for the wife [sic] as
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage.
In Higley v Higley 676 P.2d 379 (1983) then Justice Durham , writing for the court
majority, stated:
An alimony award should, in as far as possible, equalize the parties'
respective standards of living and maintain them as close as possible to the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.
One argument that Ms. Di Paolo may have meant to advance at trial is that the trial
court should read Jones v Jones 700 P.2d 1072 (1985) as superceding the previous
citations. In Jones our Supreme court proposes a three-pronged test for alimony, the
second prong of which is the ability of the wife [sic] to produce income for herself. Ms.
Di Paolo may have intended to claim that this is a reversion to the old public charge
doctrine, and may have intended for the court to interpret this as meaning that if the
recipient spouse can support themselves without public assistance, alimony is not
required. This reading is completely false. Immediately before proposing its threepronged test the Jones court quotes the passage from English v English already cited
above and says that it is for this purpose, the purpose of supporting the wife [sic] at the
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standard of living during the marriage (Italics added), that the three-pronged test is
promulgated.
The only citation to law that the trial court even suggests in its ruling is when it
seems to paraphrase English v English, supra, in saying that alimony is neither an annuity
or a penalty (Transcript 621). In English the court says that alimony is neither "a penalty
against the husband nor a reward to the wife." However the court in English immediately
afterward makes the statement quoted above, that the purpose of alimony is to support the
recipient at the standard of living of the marriage (Italics added).
The trial court seems to follow English further as it next acknowledges the "need
to take into account the standard of living that one enjoyed when they were married"
(Transcript 622). But having said this, the trial court gives absolutely no consideration to
the standard of living during marriage and proceeds to base its ruling solely on the
standard of living during separation when, as pointed out above, Mr. Ranson was living
in desperate financial circumstances.
The issue of his expenses was mentioned by Mr. Ranson at several points during
the trial (Transcript 154, 295). He discusses several times submitting a statement of his
expenses during marriage at mediation, and discusses some of the ways in which the
statement of his expenses during separation fails to reflect the required level of expenses.
During this testimony Mr. Ranson had no idea that his attorney would not submit his
actual expenses during marriage to the trial court.
Clear precedent exists for this court to set aside the trial court's reliance on the
expense calculation at time of trial and use the calculation that reflects the standard of
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living during marriage. In Gardner v Gardner, supra, the trial court relied on a
calculation which listed Mrs. Gardner' expenses as $1,200 per month. In reaching its
verdict our Supreme Court relied, instead, on a calculation Mrs. Gardner prepared prior to
trial, which listed her expenses as $1,700 per month. It found that this was a reasonable
expression of her needs and that it supported her claim for alimony in that amount. It
therefore reversed and remanded for further action.
In comparing the statement of Mr. Ranson's expenses during separation relied on
by the trial court (Addendum C-2), with the statement of Mr. Ranson's expenses during
marriage which was used at mediation in February, 2005 (Addendum A-2), it can be seen
that the total amount of Mr. Ranson's expenditures is actually higher at the time of trial.
What is different is the nature of the expenses. During separation Mr. Ranson is living
off of borrowed money and paying enormous legal fees. These needs replace more
normal ones such as automobile and appliance payments. When the trial court leaves out
these extraordinary expenditures it arrives at a figure that is 73% of Mr. Ranson's
expenses during marriage for similar, after tax items. However, this figure does not
include the $455 per month allowed by the trial court for Mr. Ranson to purchase
comparable health care, or any allowance for retirement. Adding these items makes the
actual shortfall more than 50% of his normal expenses.
This court should follow the abundant precedent in marriages of long duration and
base its assessment of Mr. Ranson's need on the standard of living during marriage. It
should follow the precedent of Gardner and base its assessment of this need on
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Addendum A-2, adding to that amount provision for health care and retirement, which
during the marriage were pre-tax expenditures.
The failure of the trial court to base Mr. Ranson's need on his standard of living
during marriage or to make any finding as to why it did not do so is a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion.
THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO ATTEMPT TO EQUALIZE THE PARTIES
STANDARDS OF LIVING AFTER DIVORCE AND MADE NO FINDING AS TO
WHY IT FAILED TO DO SO
The same tradition of law that requires the needs of parties to be based on the
standard of living during marriage also requires that in marriages of long duration, where
the parties have prospered as a result of their joint efforts, the standards of living of the
parties after marriage be equalized to the extent possible. Indeed the purpose of basing
the needs of the parties on the standard during marriage is so that a decree can be
fashioned that maintains it afterward. This is clear from the quotations from the rulings
in English v English, and Higlev v Higlev, supra.
In Frank v Frank 585 P.2d 453 (1978) the trial court awarded alimony even though
it stated at one point in its ruling that "in one sense plaintiff does not need alimony in that
she could probably subsist without it." The payor spouse appealed on the grounds that
this finding demonstrated that alimony was not necessary. Writing for a unanimous Utah
Supreme Court then Justice Crockett rejected this argument saying:
How the defendant, or anyone on his behalf, could even suggest that a wife
who had devoted 21 years to her marriage and reared a family should be
turned out to subsist on her own is as discordant with our sense of justice as
it was to the trial judge.

31

In Rasband v Rasband 752 p.2d 1331 (1988) in rejecting an award of declining
alimony as insufficient the Utah Court of Appeals said:
The award herein leaves Mr. Rasband with some discretionary income and
Mrs. Rasband with none. The lower court found $45,000 of disposable
income. He needs $18,000 annually and she needs $16,800, for a total of
$34,800. This leaves him with $10,000 annual discretionary
income.. .These facts appear to warrant permanent alimony in an amount
greater than $800.
In Dunn v Dunn, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial
court which awarded the husband the largest portion of the marital property. The Court
of Appeals found that, Mrs. Dunn was "an equal partner in the marriage." It rejected the
ruling that Dr. Dunn was entitled to a superior financial position after the divorce because
in the words of the trial court, "the period of the marriage covered probably the most
productive period of his life." The Court of Appeals noted that these years were also the
most productive of Mrs. Dunn's life during which time she "gave up or at least greatly
postponed... pursuing her own education and career."
The parallels between Mr. Ranson's situation and those of the prevailing parties in
these, the foundational precedents for Utah law governing divorce, are compelling. Mrs.
Gardner had been married 38 years. She had not worked outside the home in 30 years.
As a stay at home spouse, she supported Dr. Gardner's career while he built a successful
medical practice. She had once been a skilled executive secretary but the court found that
it would be difficult for her to regain those skills after so long an absence. She received
property and alimony to equalize their standards of living.
Mrs. Higley was married 30 years. The Utah Supreme Court found that her work
as a homemaker had made her husband's successful career as a welder possible. Mrs.
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Frank was married 21 years. She helped her husband succeed as a heart surgeon. While
he was hospitalized with an emotional illness she opened a gift shop with the help of her
parents and supported the family.
Mrs. Jones was married 30 years. During the marriage the parties established a
successful pharmacy. She worked occasionally in the business and also did extensive
volunteer work, in addition to raising their children and maintaining their home.
Mr. Ranson was married for 20 years. During the marriage he raised the parties
son and maintained their home. He supported his wife's career. When she was fired
from her tenured job as a professor he wrote the appeal that resulted in her being
reinstated. He did unpaid work on her articles, researching and writing portions of them.
He paid for and built their house.
All of the spouses in the foundational cases above received alimony and/or
property sufficient to allow them to maintain the standard of living during marriage. Mr.
Ranson received zero alimony. He was, as the Frank court put it, "turned out to subsist on
his own" as though the marriage had never happened and as though he had no part in
creating, and no claim on, Ms. Di Paolo's financial success.
At trial Mr. Ranson submitted several schedules showing the amount of alimony
needed to equalize the incomes of the parties after taxes. These used a higher gross
income for Ms. Di Paolo than was accepted by the court. A schedule is included showing
the amount of alimony which would equalize the parties incomes at Ms. Di Paolo's
current salary level and at two levels of income for Mr. Ranson, the $32,000 the trial
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court found he could earn, and the $20,800 he actually is capable of earning (Addendum
F-l).
The schedule also shows that equalizing incomes does not in fact equalize the
parties' standards of living since Ms. Di Paolo receives benefits which total 23% of her
salary and which pay for her medical insurance and retirement. Mr. Ranson must pay
these expenses out of his after tax income.
The failure of the trial court to award alimony which will equalize the parties'
standards of living and maintain them at the level during the marriage, or to offer any
reason why it did not do so, is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.
THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO ADJUSTMENT TO ITS AWARD OF
PROPERTY, OR IT'S FAILURE TO AWARD ALIMONY, IN CONSIDERATION
OF THE GREAT ENHANCEMENT OF MS. DI PAOLO'S EARNING
CAPACITY THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF BOTH PARTIES DURING THE
MARRIAGE, AND MADE NO FINDING AS TO WHY IT FAILED TO DO SO
During the course of this marriage Mr. Ranson has made enormous contributions
to the advancement of Ms. Di Paolo's career. In the first instance, he stayed home to
manage their household and raise their child. Under Utah case law these contributions
alone make him a full partner in the marriage, see Higlev v Higlev, and Dunn v Dunn,
supra. But Mr. Ranson's contributions went far beyond that to active support for Ms. Di
Paolo's career.
In 1988 Ms. Di Paolo was fired from her tenure track job as a professor at the
University of Utah. Mr. Ranson did almost all of the work on an appeal of this firing
including: contacting witnesses, researching evidence, and writing responses for Ms. Di
Paolo's signature. As a result, for the first time in the memory of anyone at the
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University such an appeal was successful and Ms. Di Paolo was restored to her position.
Thereafter Mr. Ranson worked as an unpaid assistant on Ms. Di Paolo's scholarly
publications, performing research and writing sections of her articles. He also wrote her
Year's Work letters, which are essentially applications for raises, and prepared
applications for other, more remunerative, positions for her signature.
As a result of the efforts of both parties Ms. Di Paolo's salary went form $17,000
per year at the beginning of the marriage to $78,000 per year at the time of trial.
There is a long tradition in Utah case law that when the parties have prospered
through their joint efforts that this should be acknowledged in awards of property and
alimony in the event of divorce, see Higley v Higley, Jones v Jones, Frank v Frank, and
Gardner v Gardner, supra. This tradition received its clearest statement in Martinez v
Martinez, supra, In this case the Utah Supreme Court stated unequivocally "if one
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses
during the marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and in awarding alimony."
In a concurring opinion, then Justice Zimmerman stated that, "there can be no
doubt that trial judges are empowered and enjoined to take circumstances like those
presented here into account in making alimony and property division awards."
In this same matter then Justice Durham offered a dissenting opinion. Unlike Ms.
Di Paolo and her counsel, Mr. Ranson does not argue that minority opinions confer
authority, but this opinion goes so directly to the facts of this case that it must be brought
before this court. Justice Durham wrote in part:
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The legal status quo is unacceptable...and I hope that the majority will be
willing in the future to make good on its representation that the concept of
alimony...can be accommodated to the need for equity. Unless and until
that happens any woman (or man, for that matter) who sacrifices her own
education, earning capacity, or career development so that a spouse may
advance and the marriage may prosper as a joint venture will inevitably
suffer the full cost of that decision at divorce, while the advantaged spouse
will continue to walk away from the marriage with all of the major
financial gain. That is unfair, and.. .the responsibility of the law is to seek
fairness.
This statement exactly describes this case. Mr. Ranson sacrificed his career, his
earning capacity, his education, to advance the career of his wife. When they divorced he
was told by the trial court that it was fair that he should live at the level of whatever he
could earn now, with no right to live at the level the parties had earned during marriage,
with no allowance for the reduction a 20 year break in his career had made in his earning
capacity, and with no consideration for the substantial health problems he had developed
with age.
When Mr. Ranson and Ms. Di Paolo began their marriage they had very little. He
had his college money, which he invested in their home. She had her job at the University
of Utah, which she promptly lost, but together they persevered and they succeeded
beyond their wildest dreams. She became a department chair at the University and her
salary went from $17,000 to $78,000 per year. Anyone would have thought that they
were both successful, but this is wrong. According to the trial court only Ms. Di Paolo
succeeded and Mr. Ranson has no claim to her success, and no claim on her earning
power, which was created through the efforts of them both.
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Even if we accept, in arguendo, the trial court's absurd finding that Mr. Ranson
can earn $32,000 immediately, and accept also its finding that he can live on less than
li.ilf of his expenses dmine, the iiKiniiiiie, his income is still n"l cnoiM'J) lo meet his needs.
Mr. Ranson must begin spending down marital assets immediately just to live. He must
spend these same assets to pay for his retirement. Thus the ruling of the court envisions

to near nothing in retirement, while Ms. Di Paolo has substantial assets she need not
touch, retirement more than adequate to maintain her standard of living, and an income of
$78,000 per year.
This situation is clearly and grotesquely unfair. If precedent did not already exist,
this court would have to craft an equitable remedy to correct this situation. But In fact, in
the statute and in case after case of precedent, the laws oi i , M already address this
situation and find it ii ltolerable.

• .

Consider the words of two distinguished jurists w ho would go on to become Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, of I Jtah. Chief Justice Crockett asks, "How the defendant,

marriage.. .should be turned out to subsist on her own." Chief Justice Durham asks how
it is fair that, "any woman (or man, for that matter) who sacrifices her own education,

may prosper as a joint venture will inevitably suffer the full cost of that decision at
divorce" and concludes "That is unfair, and.. .the responsibility of the law is to seek
fairness."

' •
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The law of Utah provides a remedy for the injustice of this situation and that
remedy is routinely applied to circumstances exactly matching those in this case. There
are strong indications that it was not applied here solely due to illegal sexual prejudice.
To do justice in this matter, it is only necessary for the Court of Appeals to apply the law
impartially.
mi

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING IS BASED ON ILLEGAL SEXUAL
PREJUDICE
There is substantial evidence to indicate that the ruling in this matter was the result
of sexual prejudice. To confirm this Mr. Ranson undertook a statistical study of divorce
cases filed in Third District Court contemporaneously with his. He examined a total of
297 cases(case numbers 044900577 through 044900781, 054904232 through 054904248,
and 064902574 through 064902651, Summary of data omitted due to length). The
majority of these cases were from the period February, 2004 through April, 2004, in
which month Mr. Ranson filed for divorce. He also sampled cases from other periods to
confirm that this period was not a statistical aberration. To find cases comparable under
the law to his, Mr. Ranson considered only marriages of long duration, which he took to
be of 10 years duration or greater.
The results of this study can be given in one sentence. In every case of a marriage
of long duration, in which a spouse requested alimony, they received alimony. There is
no instance of a spouse in a marriage of long duration, during the period in which Mr.
Ranson filed, in the court in which he filed, requesting alimony and being denied, except
in the case of Mr. Ranson.
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In the cases in which a spouse requested alimony, a combination of alimony, child
support, and or, property awards usually served to equalize the parties' standards of
living after marriage. As an example, in the ca.se of Williams v Williams, 04490-0601,
the parties were married for 22 years. They had one child who was 12 at the time of
divorce. The husband earned $5,417 gross per month, $65,004 annually. The wife
earned $1,5 70 gross monthly, $18,8' 10 annually, at two part time jobs.
The wife was a\* arded t\\ o thii (is erf the eqi iit> ii I the home, a 2002 model car,
child support of $530 per month, and alimony of $1,000 per month for a time equal to the
duration of the marriage. As a result of this ruling in the first year after divorce her
monthly gross income limn ,ill sources nunlti be $1,101,1 iiinl In , nnuM be $1,8X7, She
would be compensated for the difference by increased equity in the home.
This case is almost identical to the one before this court. In the current case the
parties were married 20 yea i s, their child wa s
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had no earnings. In the case of Williams, Mrs. Williams received $530 per month in
child support and $1,000 per month in alimony so that the discrepancy in incomes was

no alimony, and the difference in incomes after divorce, even using the unsupported
income finding of the trial, court is $3750 per month. That is, the difference is $1 100
niein, llian Mi. k.mson's imputed income.
Numerous other examples with strongly similar outcomes have been omitted
solely due to the length requirements of this brief. There is only one substantive
difference between I\ Ir. Ranson and the spouses who w ere granted alimony and equal
o0

standards of living. All of them are women and Mr. Ranson is a man. These facts
provide clear evidence that Mr. Ranson is the victim of sexual discrimination. This
sexual discrimination is a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution of
the United States. As such it is clear and prejudicial error.
THE TRIAL COURT MADE AN ERROR OF FACT IN FINDING THAT MR.
RANSON CAN EARN $32,000 PER YEAR WHEN HIS AVERAGE EARNINGS
PER YEAR BEFORE MARRIAGE WERE $3,230
In reaching its decision that Mr. Ranson could earn $32,000 per year immediately
the trial court relied on the opinion of Kristy Famsworth, a self employed vocational
specialist. Dr. Famsworth holds a PhD. in human development and has 20 years
experience in her field. Dr. Famsworth submitted a ten page written report in which she
finds that Mr. Ranson can find employment in fields ranging from customer service
representative to first line supervisor/manager of construction workers at "salaries"
ranging from $19,760 to $32,864. She also indicates in her report and testimony that
these "salaries" are really too low and that Mr. Ranson can easily earn up to $45,000 per
year. The court accepted this testimony and found that Mr. Ranson could earn $32,000
per year almost immediately. (A copy of Dr. Famsworth's report is included as
Addendum H-l, Index on Appeal 445)
In reaching its decision the trial court failed to recognize the large number of crucial
flaws that make Dr. Famsworth's testimony not only completely unreliable but deliberately
misleading. As she acknowledges in her testimony, Dr. Famsworth obtained information only
from Ms. Di Paolo and made not attempt to contact Mr. Ranson. (Transcript 5, 20) As a result
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Dr. Famsworth's opinion is really only the opinion of Ms. Di Paolo placed in the mouth of a
supposed expert.
I IT. larnswoith did nol have aivtss In Mr Ransorfs ,K lual turnings hislorv II i"
ii. possible to believe that she would have concluded that he was capable of earning
$32,000 immediately if she had known that his average earnings per year as a carpenter
had been $3,200. Di F arnsworth believed that 1\ lr. R anson had been a licensed general
contractoi v«v hen he had not Dr I 'arnswor th was not given accurate information about
Mr. Ranson's medical condition. She believed that he suffered from migraine headaches
and was never told that he suffers from atypical migraine episodes that can blind n. m
\\ iflioul warning" for periods up to one lioui, I >r Famsworth also made no allowance for
layoffs even though she admitted under oath that construction does not provide full time
employment.
The record also show s tl lat Dr Farnswoi 1:1 I delibera tel;;« mislead the coi
this by suggesting in her report and testimony that Mr. Ranson could occupy jobs which
she was forced to admit under oath he was not qualified iw; <he also suggested that

admit under oath that she had consulted no such evidence.
On page ten of her report Dr. Farnsworth lists the actilal conclusions of her

$24,336 as a finish carpenter, to $32,864 as a "first line construction manager". But
throughout her report and testimony she refers to jobs such as "construction manager"
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jobs as well. Under cross examination Dr. Farnsworth admits that Mr. Ranson is not
qualified to be a "construction manager" and that the only jobs he is qualified for are the
three identified above from her conclusion on page 10 (Transcript 36). When asked why
she would include higher paying jobs in her report at all Dr. Farnsworth replies with a
non-sequiteur saying that such jobs would not be a good option for Mr. Ranson
(Transcript 37). Dr. Farnsworth thus tacitly admits to larding her report with discussion
of high paying options for which Mr. Ranson is not qualified.
The second way in which Dr. Farnsworth deliberately misleads the court is by
suggesting that Mr. Ranson will receive rapid raises from the levels of starting "salary"
she lists. The only evidence she gives for this however concerns the customer service
jobs (Transcript 12). She suggests to the court that such rapid raises are available in the
construction industry as well and refers to government figures which show this.
However, later in her testimony, she admits that she did not actually consult any such
statistics in preparing this report and that this claim is based only on her unsupported
opinion (Transcript 13).
In her testimony Dr. Farnsworth admits that she gave no consideration to Mr.
Ranson5s health problems in making her analysis. As he testifies to the court, Mr.
Ranson, suffers from atypical migraine, gout, high cholesterol, rosacea, and
sleeplessness, and takes six prescription medicines daily to treat these conditions. Crucial
to his work ability is atypical migraine, the symptoms of which are not headache but
episodes of blindness which come on with no warning and last up to one hour. Mr.
Ranson experiences such symptoms hourly and experiences the longer episodes three to
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four times a year. Obviousiy u he were to have such an episode on a construction site he
could be killed.
Mr. Ranson takes the medicine Inderal to prevent these episodes froi n 'being more
severe This niediciiie km ers his hear t rate so mi ich that he cannot exert himself until he
has gradually exercised over a period of 10 to 15 minutes. This makes it completely
impossible for him to work on construction jobs, where the ability to go from doing the
most sedentary detail w ork to heav y lifting, immediately , is cr ucial. In her report Dr.
Famsworth identifies this skill as "explosive strength" and says Mr. Ranson's possession
of it is important to her analysis. (H 1, pA)
In her testimony Dr. Farnswoilh nJ'niils llial shr lliouj-jil Mr. Riinson suffered from
headaches (Transcript 28), that she did not have enough information to consider the
effects of his health on Mr. Ranson's employability (Transcript ?,9\ and that she would
m v ' i •»
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affect his abihiy 10 do construction work (Transcript 30).
In arriving at her figures for "minimum starting salary" Dr. Famsworth also fails
to COIIMIILT the iTfo.l nl'lay il'l'i \\ hilr ^iie rails HK'M* I'IJMIIV*; "salaried1 hn uwn
calculations show that these are hourly earnings and that she has arrived at the final
figures by assuming full time employment. However, under cross-examination Dr.

(Transcript 40-1). Therefore a deduction for time off, perhaps on the order of 20% or
30%, must be made form Dr. Famsworth's figures to find Mr. Ranson's actual annual
earnings.

Stripped of its deliberate deception Dr. Farnsworth's report does not contradict but
confirms Mr. Ranson's stipulation that he can earn $20,800 per year. Dr. Farnsworth lists
a staring salary for Mr. Ranson as a carpenter of $24,336, which must be reduced for
layoffs. This gives a figure almost identical to Mr. Ranson's stipulated earnings. In an
attempt to arrive at a higher value, Dr. Farnsworth first argues that Mr. Ranson is
qualified to be a "first line construction manager". She supports this idea with the claim
that Mr. Ranson was once a Licensed General Contractor. The sole evidence for this is a
license form labeled "contractor" shown to her by Ms. Di Paolo. Dr. Farnsworth claims
that in 1986 there was only one type of contractor's license, that this means that Mr.
Ranson was a general contractor, and that therefore he is qualified to manage
construction.
In fact in 1986 contractor's licenses were differentiated by the dollar value of open
contracts the licensee could have at one time. Mr. Ranson's license permitted a
maximum value of $5,000, therefore he was clearly not a general contractor. In fact, as
shown by his earnings statement (A-7), Mr. Ranson did not contract for work using this
license and obtained it solely so that he could buy materials for the parties' home at
wholesale prices.
When challenged on this point Dr. Farnsworth admits that she does not know
whether Mr. Ranson was a general contractor or not (Transcript 26). She argues that her
belief that Mr. Ranson was a general contractor was not a factor in her determination that
he was capable of being a construction supervisor (Transcript 22). She then contradicts
herself, again, by referring repeatedly to the idea that Mr. Ranson was a general
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contractor and claiming that this provides support for her idea that he is qualified as a
supervisor (Transcript 35)
Having disposed of the idea that 1^ Ii R ansoi 1 is qi lalified to occi lpy management
positions there is only one way in which Dr. Famsworth can support a claim that he can
earn more than the amount he stipulated, and that is by insisting that Mr. Ranson can

finish carpenter (Transcript 15). She bases this on no data whatsoever but solely on her
personal opinion based on "the years of experience he has had". Under examination Dr.
Famsworth denies llr.it utiv ullowaitiv intisl W made I'm' (he veins Mi. Raiison,has been
out of the workforce because carpentry consists of "pounding nails, that certainly there's
not much change in that" (Transcript 27N T1- s is u t ^ '\ classist prejudice but shows
]> ^ • • •
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'> • . consti i iction in the last 20

years. Dr. Farnsworthfs testimony on this point shows her desperation to reach a
conclusion that shows Mr. Ranson can make $32,000 per year, in accordance with the
wishes of her client
Reference to his earnings statement (A-7) should remove any doubt that Mi
Ranson's is not able to earn in this range. In fact the only job he has been able to obtain
since tin: di\ntve w;is ;i tempnrarv mie at llnine Pqmi whii.li paid hint 'k|0 per hour,
which would be $20,800 per year if he worked full time. (Mi. Ranson's VV -2
included due to length)
Fiiiall) , let us assume, in arguendo, that Mr. Ranson's health problems did not
prevent himfromworking constn iction I le is 55 years old If hew ere able to perform
-is

.

•

'

'..

:

the strenuous activities of construction now, would he be able to do so in 5 years when he
is 60, in 10 years when he is 65? Mr. Ranson has no financial ability to retire. He will
have to work as long as he lives. It is obvious that he must retrain now, in a field other
than construction, which he will be able to pursue for as long as he can stand upright.
i

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Petitioner and Appellant prays the court for the
following relief: For an order modifying the decree of divorce to award Mr. Ranson
alimony in the amount of $2,400 per month. This is the amount that would equalize the
parties' incomes at the level Mr. Ranson can actually earn. It would not equalize their
total receipts due to the benefits Ms. Di Paolo receives.
Failing this:
For an order for a New Trial so that Mr. Ranson can present an affirmative case on
his own behalf which would include: Testimony from a physician who has treated Mr.
Ranson for ocular migraine and the entry of Mr. Ranson's medical records; Testimony
from an employment counselor employed by Mr. Ranson and the entry of the records of
Mr. Ranson earnings history; Mr. Ranson's statement of his actual expenses during
marriage;
In its order for New Trial this court should require the trial court to make findings
as to: Mr. Ranson's need for retirement; The standard of living during marriage and the
need to equalize standards of living after divorce; Mr. Ranson's contributions to Ms. Di
Paolo's earning ability; Ms. Di Paolo's current income; The effect of taxes on Mr.
Ranson's ability to meet his needs, as well as other pertinent issues.
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If, against the law and the facts, this comt chooses to sustain the trial court's
deeply flawed verdict it should, at the least, enter an order awarding Mr. Ranson

the marriage, to correct the plain error of the trial court in failing to allow for the effect
of taxes on Mr. Ranson's ability to meet his needs.
• There is absoh itely no grounds for sustaining the ci irrent decree & hich has no
basis in law or fact.
DATED this 12th day of February, 2007. •

Kenneth Clark Ranson
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of February, 2007,1 caused to be delivered by first
class mail, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the
following:
Robert De\ in Pusey
140 West 9000 South, #7
Sandy, UT 84070

Kenneth Clark Ranson
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ADDENDUM A
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Divorce
Case for Trial
Alimony
Method
Establish Marianna's income.
Establish my income.
Establish our needs.
Demonstrate that our joint current needs are greater than our joint income
and that my needs are greater than my income plus one half of Marianna's
income and ask for income sharing.
Marianna's Income
Marianna absolutely refuses to produce her Dean's Salary letters or her
Compensation Status forms for the last two years. She claims they are lost
and the College can't give her copies.
These forms show what she actually makes. The latter includes all of her
benefits as well and shows her total compensation. She is desperate to keep
us from seeing these, obviously because they show her making more income
than she is reporting otherwise.
Get copies of Dean's Salary letters and Compensation Status Forms for
2004-2005 and 2003-2004."'
My ln< nine
1 cannot return to work as a carpenter because I have been out of the field for
16 years and because of health problems. My physician will make an
affidavit attesting that I cannot work as a carpenter or do any physically
strenuous work. This will mean that I will have to work for entry level
wages now and from now on, unless I can retrain in another professional
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field. This is why I am going to college and why it makes sense for both me
and Marianna that I be allowed to go to college.
Do I need to see an employment counselor to establish what I can make or
should I just take the most remunerative job I can qualify for?
Get affidavit from Dr. Lewis Barton,
See employment counselor??
Get Job.
Expenses
So far I have done all of the work on trying to determine our expenses while
Marianna has taken our financial records and refuses to let me see them or
provide information from them.
I have worked on the principal that we should determine our expenses as
they were during the marriage since I am entitled to spousal support that will
allow me to maintain the lifestyle that we had during the marriage.
I have done a breakdown of our expenses for 2002 and I have received
additional information from Marianna, from records that I maintained and
she stole after having me removed form the house under a protective order
she later withdrew, that may be enough to let me determine the same
expenses for 2003. I have not done this because it takes tens of hours of
work and I did not know if we needed it.
To the 2002 expense calculation I made we will have to add the new
expenses we will have living separately, health insurance for me, rent for
her, etc. We should also add the amount that we saved each year. These
funds were for the most part not savings for the future but were in lieu of
time purchase agreements for large items. Because we owned the house that
I built we were able to put money in savings every month and then when we
needed a large consumer item, a car, furniture, an expensive trip, we paid for
it in cash. These "savings" then took the place in out budget that a car
payment or installment payments take in the budgets of other people.
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Am I right in thinking that if both Marianna" s needs and my needs living
separately are greater than one half of her salary that this is grounds to ask
the court to order income equalization alimony??
Do I need to calculate 2003 expenses and on what basis??

Dmsion iif Pi oprrly
House
Marianna proposes that she take one half of the property that I brought to the
marriage, the house that I built and paid for, the large gains form
investments that I researched and followed, but that I not receive a share of
the value of her career which she could not have had without my saving her
job and researching her articles, not to mention taking care of the house and
Sean.
I can demonstrate that I contributed most of the money and all of the work to
choose the location, buy the lot, design and build our house. Of the money
used to build the house 37,000 was a gift from my parents which they gave
me in place of any money they might have contributed to my college
education. It was never their intention or my intention that Marianna be
gifted with this money. It has always been my separate property which was
invested in the house. My records show that I always accounted for this
money separately. It was never commingled with or exchanged for any
other asset. Now that I have to return to school and get a college education
it is only fair that I receive this money back.
Repairs
The house needs extensive repairs. There is nothing unusual about this. We
have lived in it almost 17 years and raised our family there and it is at the
end of a wear cycle. Houses often need extensive repairs or remodeling at
this stage. Also I have not been able to keep up with the repairs I would
normally make because I had health problems every year for the three years
previous to this one. My medical records will document this.

4

Marianna wants the house sold without repairs so that my share of our estate
will be reduced. While this will reduce her receipts also she is wiling to do
this to revenge herself on me. She knows that she can easily get more
money through her career and that I cannot.
House to be deeded to Ken
It would be reasonable for Marianna to deed the house to me. She can be
fully compensated by receiving a larger share of her retirement funds. In
this way I could make the repairs to the house which I built and paid for and
which is really an asset I brought to the marriage and Marianna would keep
more of her retirement. This would allow us to separate our affairs
completely and would prevent arguments, recriminations, and lawsuits over
who was making the repairs, whether they were being done fast enough and
in the right way, etc.
Primary Care Giver/Use of the House
Regardless of how the house is disposed of on a permanent basis I should
receive the use of the house until Sean graduates from high school. I have
always been his primary care giver, delaying my career and staying home
with him. It is in his best interests that we continue this relationship until he
goes to college which will occur in one and a half years from now. It would
be very hard on him to have to adjust to a completely new living
arrangement for that period. Sean agrees with this and wants to stay in his
home.

Get an affidavit from my mother concerning the nature and purpose of her
giftGet from Marianna my file marked Lot Purchase-Parkcrest Number 4 and its
contents. I need this to finish documenting the source of funds used to
construct the house.
Have house appraised as to its current value. Get Marianna to agree to pay
for half of this

5

Other Monetary Assets
Our other monetary assets, Marianna's retirement after an offset for the
house, and our stock account, should be divided equally between us. Their
value can be easily determined because it is published every weekday in
dollars.
Personal Property
After having me removed from the home with a false protective order which
she withdrew as soon as I responded to it Marianna helped herself to all of
the newest and most valuable personal property including a new car, the
artwork and all of the new furniture and left me with old broken almost
worthless items.
This is not fair.
All of the personal property in possession of both of us should be seen by us
both and marital property inventoried and valued by an appraiser. We
should then divide this property with each party receiving an equal dollar
amount.
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Details of child custody
There are some real problems with our current child custody arrangement.
Sean is falling asleep in class because Marianna lets him stay up all night on
Friday and Saturday nights when he is in her custody. As nearly as I can tell
he does not do any work when he is with her. We need to agree on a
schedule for him that allows him to get enough sleep and under which he
does some school work every day.
We need to agree to a vacation schedule that will allow both parents to take
longer trips with Sean. Ken has always done this with him and these are an
important part of Sean's education.
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Other Issues
Return of my financial records.
I need copies of all of the files that I maintained and which Marianna
removed from the house when I was not permitted to be there because of her
phony protective order claim.
Christmas schedule
I would like to make an agreement that would divide Sean's time during the
Christmas holidays so that we could each take him to our respective homes
for Christmas.

AttAtM hi
Estimate of expenses from 25/FEB/05 using 2002 figures
Needs to be updated from current actuals were applicable
Table 2
Petitioner's Expenses based on actual 2002 expenses and addtions due to divorce
Actual expenses have been divided by 2 to reflect expenses for Petitioner and Sean living at home half time.
The value of the parties actual accumulations in lieu of installment payments has been added.
An amount for health insurance for Petitioner has been added.

Category
Groceries
Restaurant
Auto
Travel
Utilities
Clothes
Home Repairs
Medical, Drugs, and Grooming
Miscellaneous (wine, Sean's toys and activities, gifts, pets)
Mobile Phones
Household Items
Books and Office
Entertainment
Insurance
Honda
Ramcharger
Homeowner's
Health Insurance
Accumulations in lieu of car, appliance, and furniture payments
Cash
Marianna's uncategorized checks

Total

329
231
123
185
308
106
86
135
113
40
40
46
37
165
75
44
46

450
596
23
275
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a schedule where one parent would have every Mon and Tues; the other
parent would have every Wed and Thur; and then you all would alternate
every other Fri, Sat and Sun - which again gives you both weekend time
and the ability to take extended 3 or 4 day weekend trips. Think about
this one as it has the potential to avoid a lot of problems.
4. Finally, Marianna appears to still be stuck on the money you spent
in the early days/weeks of your separation. Specifically, she believes
your squandered up to $15,000 in 6 weeks and she wants you to have to
bear the burden of these expenses. I indicated that you all were still
married and that these are marital debts that you should equally bear.
Robert and Marianna view it differently. Given the waste of time,
money, and emotional energy this issue will no doubt command, I suggest
we propose that (once more with the exception of the art/baskets which
should remain on the table) you waive your concern over the monetary
difference in the present personal property division, in exchange for
Marianna waiving this claim. They have approximate = equal values.
Further, much mileage and good faith can come from such a compromise.
So, while we did not reach any answers, Robert and I did script out
further discussions. Per Robert, Marianna remains open to continuing in
mediation - with counsel only. Marcie has tentatively set aside April
20 at 1:00 for a further meeting. Please review this stuff and get back
with me.
At the end of it all, it is quite clear that you all are in a power
struggle, whereby Marianna wants more control over parenting and parent
time (an area where you have traditionally dominated) and you want more
equality and control over income and money (an area that Marianna has
controlled). I hope we can resolve many or most of your issues, but am
not convinced mediation is the only way to accomplish this. I^ believe^
room stilt remains for you and I to finalize a written response ta
Marianna's written proposal and see where that takes us. It would be
more time and cost-efficient and if we act quickly, we can get out a
proposal before Aprif 20 - which could avoid that meeting or make it
much more productive.
Let me know your thoughts.
Bridget K. Romano, Esq.
Kruse Landa Maycock & Ricks, LLC
The information contained in this e-mail message is legally privileged
and/or confidential information intended only for the receipt by and use
of the individual or entity to whom or which it is addressed. If you
are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly
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From:
Subject:
Date:
To:

'§

*

"Bridget Romano" <bromano@klmrlaw.com>
Your Case
July 18, 2005 2:51:48 PM MDT
<kennethranson@earthlink.net>

Ken,
I will be turning up the heat on trial prep in the coming days. Please let me know whether there have been
any new developments I should be aware of. Also, please let me know if you've decided upon any terms
that I am authorized to put forward in the hopes we may reach a settlement in this matter.
I have notes of the proposals we have tossed about, but have never made. It is often the case that as a
trial looms large, cases which appeared stuck in the mud somehow get jump-started once more.
Also, let me know the status of your present employment.
Bridget K. Romano, Esq.
Kruse Landa Maycock & Ricks, LLC
The information contained in this e-mail message is legally privileged and/or confidential information
intended only for the receipt by and use of the individual or entity to whom or which it is addressed. If you
are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of
this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please immediately notify us
by telephone and delete this message from your computer. Thank you.

fl/juyw? tr*
From: bromano@klmrlaw.com
Subject: Re: Bit of good news
Date: August 4, 2005 9:30:08 AM MDT
To: kennethranson@earthlink.net
Ken,
The problem respecting the admissibility of your medical information is
not simply Dr. Barton's reluctance. It is also a factor of my not
knowing of the additional information you are now providing before this
week.
Had I known you were recently seen at the ER for a complex migraine or
that you had completed a neurological workup with a physician other than
Dr. Barton, we could have identified this information on your witness
and exhibit lists. While I can submit amended lists setting out new
names and information, given the late date, Robert Pusey has every right
to object and it would clearly be within the judge's discretion to
sustain that objection. Furthermore, it gives the newly identified
medical providers very little notice.
You've only talked about Dr. Barton up to this point and I have always
understood he was the doc who diagnosed and who actively managed your
migraines. This appears not to be the case and thus we are in a box, so
to speak. Dr. Barton believes he made the limitations of his knowledge
of ocular migraines clear in March. He also believes he made it clear
he was not able to provide you with the type of information you were
seeking to rebut a claim that you are malingering and are indeed
employable. I do not know what happened during your consultation in
March. I only have your account * that Dr. Barton was getting cold
feet b/c he treats both you and Marianna and is loathe to go to court
* and Dr. Barton's recollection and sparse medical record. Dr.
Barton indicates he did not contact me earlier, as HIPPA prevents him
from doing so. He called this week only b/c he was compelled by my
subpoena to do so.
I realize it is frustrating to you that we cannot simply submit records
or complex affidavits. However, due process dictates that Marianna
receive notice and an opportunity to confront proposed testimony. She
cannot cross examine medical records or an affidavit any more than I can
* and it is for this reason I have objected to Marianna's intent to
introduce her own medical records without also calling as a witness the
doctor who prepared these records.
You may certainly testify about your lengthy history, your
understanding or your diagnoses, and of the debilitating impact of your

migraines.
Quite frankly, the most important witnesses in most divorce cases are
the parties. Further, many trial are conducted with only the Petitioner
and Respondent providing testimony.
Your medical history is relevant, but it is not the lynch-pin. You
have not been certified as disabled; you have not applied for or been
granted SSI benefits; and your migraines do not render you unemployable
per se. The real use of your medical history is tp rule out a job in
construction. This testimony and evidence in my opinion, however, is
simply gravy. I believe your age, the fact you have not worked in
construction (or any trade) for 20 years, and your present enrollment in
college do more to advance your claims respecting your limited
employability than the fact of ocular migraines. Additionally, I
suspect Judge Fratto is not really going to assume you should put on a
tool belt and start swinging a hammer.
As I have indicated, focusing unduly upon your migraines is a risky
proposition in view the fact you still hold a valid driver's license;
you operate a vehicle w/ no apparent restrictions; and you frequently
transport your son. Likewise, your migraine condition does not stand
in the way of your pursuing a degree or in meeting your academic
requirements. If we attempt to drive home over and again the blinding
and limiting effect of ocular migraine, you unintentionally and
unwittingly put your judgement respecting Sean and his safety before the
court, and, you risk looking foolish given your other intended testimony
respecting the sheer number of hours you spend reading and preparing for
class and the fact of your excellent marks.
I have still not seen Kristy Farnsworth's report respecting her view of
your employment options. I have asked for it 2x. Accordingly, on
Monday I filed a motion asking the court to exclude this report b/c you
and I have been denied the opportunity to review and rebut the report.

I will be in touch today with any questions and I will let you know if
I talk further with Dr. Barton or with the UTs General Counsel.

Bridget K. Romano, Esq.
Kruse Landa Maycock & Ricks, LLC
The information contained in this e-mail message is legally privileged
and/or confidential information intended only for the receipt by and use

of the individual or entity to whom or which it is addressed. If you
are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly
prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please
immediately notify us by telephone and delete this message from your
computer. Thank you.
Kenneth Ranson <kennethranson@earthlink.net> 8/3/2005 4:53 PM > »
Bridget
Well all of that seems perfectly reasonable.
What I cannot believe is that because one physician does not like to go
to court that my entire medical history is inadmissible. There must be
some way around this. (Just as a side note I had to close my eyes five
times while writing that last sentence.)
On 5/MAY/05 I went to the University Hospital emergency room for
numbness on the entire right side of my body. The resident neurologist
who treated me was,
Dr. Jean Louis
University of Utah Neurology Department
581-2121
His supervising physician was apparently
Dr. M. Scott Lindscott
The emergency room physician who saw me was
Dr. Deane Long
Her supervisor was apparently
Dr. Alan Condie
They ordered an MRI to rule out stroke and arrived at a diagnosis of
complex migraine.

/HWWf * v
"Bridget Romano" <bromano@klmrlaw.com>
COBRA policy
August 12, 2005 10:19:41 AM MDT
<kennethranson@earthlink.net>
Ken,
Please contact the U of U benefits office to get a letter or written
statement verifying the info you received over the phone respecting
COBRA coverage.
I have called, they cannot release info to me.
I looks like you talked to Thauna Kazakevicius, who told you the total
premium for med and dent would be $454.63 and med only would be $418.51.

We will plug those numbers into an updated expense schedule, but would
be wise to have written support.
Also, in the event we are going to trial and Dr. Farnsworth testifies,
please contact the profs you have referred to so I may talk with them
about your ptotntial for being accepted to grad school.
Alternatively, if trial is going and if only to streamline matters, I
propose we agree to stipulate that you can earn $10.00 per hour or
$20,800 per year.
And, I have just received your email and I will be in touch.
I am scrambling with the rest of the exhibits today * which I had put
on hold and which need to be copied and delievered to Pusey and the
court if we are a go.
Bridget K. Romano, Esq.
Kruse Landa Maycock & Ricks, LLC
The information contained in this e-mail message is legally privileged
and/or confidential information intended only for the receipt by and use
of the individual or entity to whom or which it is addressed. If you
are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly
prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please
immediately notify us by telephone and delete this message from your
computer. Thank you.

Help Us Keep Your Earnings Record Accurate
You, your employer and Social Security share
responsibility for the accuracy of your earnings record.
Since you began working, we recorded your reported
earnings under your name and Social Security number.
We have updated your record each time your employer (or
you, if you're self-employed) reported your earnings.
Remember, it's your earnings, not the amount of taxes
you paid or the number of credits you've earned, that
determine your benefit amount When we figure that
amount, we base it on your average earnings over your
lifetime. If our records are wrong, you may not receive
all the benefits to which you are entitled.
T Review this chart carefully using your own records
to make sure our information is correct and that
we've recorded each year you worked. You're the only
person who can look at the earnings chart and know
whether it is complete.
-Some or all of^eur-gamings4ramJ^
be shown on your Statement It could be that we
were still processing last year's earnings reports

when your Statement was prepared. Your complete
earnings for last year will be shown on next year's
Statement Note: If you worked for more than
one employer during any year, or if you had both
earnings and self-employment income, we combined
your earnings for the year.
r

There's a limit on the amount of earnings on which
you pay Social Security taxes each year. The limit
increases yearly. Only the maximum taxable amount
will appear on your earnings chart. (For Medicare
taxes, the maximum earnings amount began rising
in 1991. Since 1994, all of your earnings are taxed for
Medicare.)

r

Call usrightamy at 1-800-772-1213 (7 a.m.-7 p.m.)
if any earnings for years before last year are shown
incorrectly. If possible, have vour W-2 or tax return
for those years handy. (If you live outside the U.S.,
follow the directions at the bottom of Page 4.)

Your Earnings Record at a Glance Years You
Worked

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
198£_
1987
1988
1989

Your Taxed
Social Security
Bapijngc

$ 2,494
1,329
3,921
2,674
8,553
2,900
5,288
4,364
470
310

Your Taxed
Medicare
Earnings

$

2,494
1,329
3,921
2,674
8,553
2,900
5,288
4,364
470
310

0
0
0
192
0
0
JL
0
0
0

0
0
0
192
0
0
0
0
0
0

Years You
Worked

Your Taxed
Medicare
Earnings

Your Taxed
Social Security
Earnings

1990
$
0
1991
0
1992
0
1993
0
1994
887
1995
1375
1996
0
1997
1,071
1998
677
1999
0
2000
0
2001
0
2002 Notyetrecorded-

$

0
0
0
0
887
1,375
0
1,071
677
0
0
0

Totals over your working careen
Estimated taxes paid for Social Security:
You paid:
$2,059
Your employers paid:
$1,565
Note: If you are self-employed, you pay the

Estimated taxes paid for Medicare:
You paid:
$381
Your employers paid:
$267
total tax on your net earnings.
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ROBERT DEVIN PUSEY #2665
Attorney for Respondent
Bank of the West Building
140 West 9000 South, Suite 7
Sandy, Utah 84070-2033
Telephone: (801) 566-9286
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

KENNETH CLARK RANSON,

*

Petitioner,

*

vs.

*

MARIANNA DIPAOLO,

*

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS &
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITON
TO PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Civil No. 044900818 DA
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
Comm. T. Patrick Casey

*

COMES NOW the Respondent above-named, by and through counsel, and hereby offer
ner memorandum of points & authorities in opposition to Petitioner's Motion for New Trial as
Follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Prior to commencing trial of this divorce action, the parties stipulated to a

resolution of all issues save two, to wit: Petitioner's claim for alimony and Petitioner's claim for a
pre-marital share in the marital residence.
2.

The Court then convened for trial to hear evidence regarding the two reserved
1

issues on August 16th, 17th, 25th and 29th, 2005. During trial both parties were called to offer
direct testimony in support of their claims and defenses, and each party was extensively crossexamined by opposing counsel. An expert witness was also called by Respondent and subjected
to extensive cross-examination. Also in furtherance of the case the Court received thirty exhibits
into evidence, at least 23 offered by Petitioner.
3.

At the conclusion of the four-day trial, the Court rendered its findings,

conclusions and ruling from the bench.
4.

By his pro se pleadings Petitioner apparently seeks a new trial, and as authority

bffers Rule 59, U.R.C.P.
POINT I
RULE 59, U.R.C.P., DOES NOT AFFORD A
LEGAL BASIS FOR PETITIONER TO REQUEST
A NEW TRIAL IN THIS CASE

5.

Rule 59, U.R.C.P, provides in relevant part as follows:
Rule 59. New trials; amendment of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may
be granted to all or any of they parties and on all or part of the issues, for
any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for new
trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if
one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact
and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment:

2

(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either
party was prevented from having a fair trial;.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against;
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making
the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produce

6.

The relief requested by petitioner is not supported by the rule.
a. Irregularity in the proceedings.

7.

First under the rule, a party can only seek a new trial based upon an irregularity

arising from anyone other than themselves (the Court's conduct, ruling or abuse of discretion, or
jhe conduct of the opposing party or the jury). Thus Rule 59(a)(1) does not support the request
ror relief.
b. Accident or surprise.
8.

Next, under the rule a new trial may be granted upon a theory of accident or

surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Yet according to Plaintiffs
pleadings he anticipated each issue that would be presented at trial, and was apprised of the
evidence supporting Respondent's case. Thus, a new trial cannot be granted on a theory of
accident or surprise.
c. Newly discovered evidence.
3

9.

Next, a new trial may also be warranted on the ground of newly discovered

evidence. Petitioner now postulates three now-considered deficiencies in his case: (1) an absence
of medical testimony; (2) an absence of medical records; and (3) an absence of employmentrelated testimony.
I

10.

However, these deficiencies cannot be considered newly discovered evidence

> because such a claim requires three elements: First, it must be material, competent evidence
which is in fact newly discovered. Second, it must be such that it could not, by due diligence,
nave been discovered and produced at trial. Finally, it must not be merely cumulative or
incidental, but must be of sufficient substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with it
there would have been a different result. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 2.d 832,841 (Utah
1984) In this case a claim of newly discovered evidence cannot be supported by the facts.
11.

First, each of these issues were known to Petitioner in advance of trial as admitted

In his affidavit and supporting exhibits.
12.

Second, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he exercised due diligence in

developing this information. While Petitioner lays blame on his former counsel, his pleadings
and the exhibits attached thereto amply illustrate that he personally active in his case and at some
points steering it, that he was given the information required to develop such evidence but
apparently failed to do so. For instance, Petitioner was given every opportunity to seek an expert
relative to his vocational status, Saara Grizell, but chose not to do so. (See Petitioner's Exhibit

4

JV16 attached to his affidavit) Indeed, even Petitioner's personal physician was unwilling to
testify that Petitioner was not malingering, nor that he was unable to work. (See Petitioner's
Exhibit A-17 attached to his affidavit)
13.

Third and finally, to assert a claim of newly discovered evidence Petitioner must

be able to establish that the then-missing evidence is now in existence, but he has failed to do so.
The evidence that Petitioner proposes he may offer is merely speculative at this time, and does
not currently exist to support his motion. See In the interest of S.R & B.R, 735 P.2d 53 (Utah
Q987)
14.

For the foregoing reasons Petitioner's request for relief under Rule 59 is not well

taken and should be denied.

POINT 11
PETITIONERS REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL
ON THE BASIS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE LAW OR THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

15.

The general theme of Petitioner's Motion for New Trail sounds on a theory of

'ineffective assistance of counsel." No such basis exists to seek a new trial in a civil matter.
16.

Contrary to Petitioner's representations regarding Maltby v. Cox Construction,

Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979), in that case the Utah Supreme Court held as follows:
"And while incompetence of counsel may be a ground for granting a new triaWn a
5

criminal case where the defendant's life and liberty are at stake, this Court'has never, to
our knowledge, granted a new trial on such a ground in a civil action. I would adopt the
position of the Oklahoma Supreme Court as stated in the case of Wilson v. Sherman, 461
P.2d 606 (1969):
"While perhaps as an abstract proposition of law it may be possible to
grant a new trial in civil litigation upon the ground that one of the parties was
prevented from having a fair trial because of alleged negligence on the part of his
attorney, we know of no such rule having been recognized in this or any other
jurisdiction for that matter. Defendants cite no cases. Furthermore, it would seem
unfair and harsh to thus penalize the other side in the litigation by requiring him to
again present his cause to another jury at a new trial."

As criminal matters, the cases of Strickland v. Washington and State v. Lopez cited by Petitioner
ire clearly distinguishable from this matter.
17.

Moreover, the record is replete with the zealous, professional efforts of

Petitioner's counsel in all aspects of trial in this action. Plaintiffs other complaints related to
counsel's performance regarding settlement offers, proposals, pre-trial settlement and the like are
likewise not true, and additionally they are irrelevant to trial performance.
18.

For the foregoing reasons Petitioner's request for relief under a theory of

•[incompetent counsel" is not supported by the law or the facts of this case, and should therefore
pe denied.
WHEREFORE, Respondent respectfully prays the Court for the following relief:
1.

To dismiss Petitioner's Motion for New Trial, that Petitioner take nothing thereby;

6

2.

For an award of her reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred to respond to the

^notion in an amount to be established by affidavit; and
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem fair and proper in the

premises.
DATED this

w

day of March, 2006.

ROBERT DEVIN PUSEY
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for New Trial by first class mail, postage
(prepaid, this / O day of March, 2006, to:
KENNETH C. RANSON
Petitioner Pro Se
2096 E. 10095 Sojtfh
Sandy,,

KENNETH CLARK RANSON
V.

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 044900818
Judge Fratto

MARIANNA DEPAOLO
The matter is before the court to consider petitioner's Motion for New Trial. Petitioner
argues that he is entitled to a new trial because his attorney was ineffective.
The legal concept of ineffective assistance of counsel, as a basis to either reverse a
decision or mandate a new trial, is applicable only in criminal cases. If the court was persuaded
that the proceedings (including the conduct of petitioner's counsel) had resulted in an "injustice,"
appropriate remedial action could be taken, including granting a new trial. Petitioner, however,
has failed to demonstrate that an injustice has occurred in this case.
Petitioner has alleged that his lawyer failed to present certain evidence. There has been no
showing that such evidence exists, it could have been presented at the trial and the decision
would have been different after the court's consideration of this evidence.
Accordingly, the motion is denied.
This minute entry constitutes the order regarding the matters addressed herein. No further
order is required.

ADDENDUM C

RANSON v. Pi PAOLO
Civil No. 044900818 DA
ANALYSIS OF PETITIONER'S INCOME

Annual income identified by Dr. Farnsworth Annual fcdeial tax identified by Diane Castell Annual state tax identified by Diane Castell Annual F1CA tax identified by Diane Castell Annual medicare tax identified by Diane Castell -

$32,864.00
3,381.00
1,559.00
2,038.00
477.00

GROSS MONTHLY INCOME:
Federal tax
State tax
FICA
Medicare

$2,738.67
(281.75)
(129.92)
(16983)
(39.75)

NET MONTHLY INCOME:

E*trade account
Schooling
Equalize autos
One-halfremainder
One-half remainder
TOTALS:

$180,000
(15,000)
(5,265)
(79,867.50)
(79,867.50)
-0-

Sean
$15,000

$2,117.42

Kenneth

Marianna

$5,265
$79,867.50
$79,867 50
$15,000

$85,132.50

$79,867.50

RANSON v. DiPAOLO
Case No. 044900818
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey
PETITIONER'S MONTHLY EXPENSES
Rent or mortgage payments
Real property taxes (residence) (current actual amount)
Real property insurance (residence)
Maintenance (residence)
Food and household supplies
Restaurant and eating out
Utilities:
Electricity
Natural gas
Water and Garbage
Sewer
Cable Television
1 Internet
1 Telephone: Home; Cellular; Long Distance
1 Clothing, laundry & dry cleaning (Ken and Sean)
1 Medical, drugs and grooming
1 Dental expenses
1 Insurance - Medical/Dental Ins. Premium for Kenneth
1 Insurance - Auto
[ School - Sean's Tuition/Expenses
1 School - Kenneth's tuition and expenses
1 Entertainment
1 Health Club Membership
Loan Repayment: Rose Ranson
1 Travel
1 Auto expense (gas / repairs & maintenance)
1 Auto payments
1 Legal Fees
1 Misc. Cash Expenses
I Other: Wine, Sean's toys and activities, gifts, pets
1
Books; Office Supplies; Postage
1

TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES:

1
1

$0|
114
43
50
394
253

1

45 J
66
58
4
41
41
134
50
191
0
455
74
^25J
313

50 1

X
680 1
100
280
0
450
85
133
37

1 $4,800

4

ADDENDUM F

M

Alimony-AB

Income equalization alimony assumiing different levels of income for Kenneth Ranson
Assume Mr. Ranson can earn the amount accepted by the trial court, $32,000 per year
Marianna
77000 Gross Income

Ken
32000 Gross Income
Federal Income Tax

Federal Income Tax
0
77000
6200
4850
65950

Alimony
Adjusted Gross Income
2 exemptions
standard deduction
Federal Taxable Income

32000
3100
4850
24050

3246 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single

13231 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single

Utah Income Tax

Utah Income Tax
77000
4650
4850
6615.5
60884.5

Adjusted Gross Income
1 exemption
standard deduction
Federal Taxable Income

32000
2325
4850
1623
23202

Adjusted Gross Income
2 exemptions
standard deduction
1/2 federal tax
Utah Taxable Income

Adjusted Gross Income
1 exemption
standard deduction
1/2 federal tax
Utah Taxable Income

1503 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single

4141 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single

27251 Ken's Net Income After Taxes

59628 Marianna's Net Income After Taxes
Assume alimony of $1900 per month
Marianna
77000 Gross Income

Ken
54800 Gross Income
Federal Income Tax

Federal Income Tax
22800
54200
6230
4850
43150

Alimony
Adjusted Gross Income
2 exemptions
standard deduction
Federal Taxable Income

7519 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single

54800
3100
4850
46850

Adjusted Gross Income
1 exemption
standard deduction
Federal Taxable Income

8444 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single

Utah Income Tax

Utah Income Tax

54200 Adjusted Gross Income
4650 2 exemptions

54800 Adjusted Gross Income
2325 1 exemption

Page 1

Alimony-AB

4850 standard deduction
3759.5 1/2 federal tax
40940.5 Utah Taxable Income

4850 standard deduction
4222 1/2 federal tax
43403 Utah Taxable Income

2745 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single
43936 Marianna's Net Income After Taxes
Marianna's income will be

498 greater than Ken's

2918 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single
43438 Ken's Net Income After Taxes

Alimony-AB

Effects of Medical Expenses and Benefits
Marianna's Benefits
as percentage of salary
Retirement
Medical Insurance
Dental Insurance
Life Insurance
Disability Insurance

Ken's premium to continue current level of health insurance
COBRA premium per month
455
14.2
8.4
0.87
0.17
0.07

Total Benefits as percent

23.71

Total cash value

18257

Marianna's total compensation
AFTER taxes AND benefits

Annual total

5460

Ken's disposable Income after
health insurance

62193

Amount Marianna's total compensation including benefits is greater
than Ken's disposable income after health insurance.

24215

37978

Allmony-AB

Assume Mr. Ranson can earn his actual earnings, $10 per hour
Marlanna
77000 Gross Income

$20,800 per year
Ken
20800 Gross Income
Federal Income Tax

Federal Income Tax
0
77000
6200
4850
65950

Alimony
Adjusted Gross Income
2 exemptions
standard deduction
Federal Taxable Income

20800
3100
4850
12850

1574 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single

13231 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single

Utah Income Tax

Utah Income Tax
77000
4650
4850
6615.5
60884.5

Adjusted Gross Income
1 exemption
standard deduction
Federal Taxable Income

20800
2325
4850
787
12838

Adjusted Gross Income
2 exemptions
standard deduction
1/2 federal tax
Utah Taxable Income

Adjusted Gross Income
1 exemption
standard deduction
1/2 federal tax
Utah Taxable Income

778 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single

4141 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single

18448 Ken's Net Income After Taxes

59628 Marlanna's Net Income After Taxes
Assume alimony of $2400 per month
Marlanna
77000 Gross Income

Ken
49600 Gross Income
Federal Income Tax

Federal Income Tax
28800
48200
6200
4850
37150

Alimony
Adjusted Gross Income
2 exemptions
standard deduction
Federal Taxable Income

6019 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single

49600
3100
4850
41650

Adjusted Gross Income
1 exemption
standard deduction
Federal Taxable Income

7156 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single

Utah Income Tax

Utah Income Tax

48200 Adjusted Gross Income
4650 2 exemptions
4850 standard deduction

49600 Adjusted Gross Income
2325 1 exemption
4850 standard deduction
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Alimony-AB

3578 1/2 federal tax
38847 Utah Taxable Income

3009.5 1/2 federal tax
35690.5 Utah Taxable Income
2377 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single
39804 Marianna's Net Income After Taxes
Marianna's Income will be

-42 greater than Ken's

2598 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single
39846 Ken's Net Income After Taxes
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ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYABILITY

For

Kenneth Ranson

Prepared by

Kristy Famsworth, Ph.D.
FARNSWORTH & ASSOCIATES
9557 South 700 East, #100
Sandy, UT 84070
(801)572-5633

&

arnsworth

Kristy Farnsworth, Ph.D., P.C.
CRC, CVE, CDMS, DABVE

&. Associates

*

Rehabilitationist
Life Care Planner
Psychologist"
(Idaho Licensure)

ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYABILITY

CLIENT:

Kenneth Ranson

REFERRED BY:

Robert D. Pusey, Esq.

EVALUATED BY:

Kristy Farnsworth, Ph.D.
Vocational Specialist

DATE:

August 2, 2005

I have had an opportunity to complete a labor market survey and analysis of
employability based upon information provided by Ms. DiPaolo for Mr. Kenneth Ranson.
It is my opinion that Mr. Ranson's starting salary would be expected to range from
$19,760 up to $32,864.

CURRENT VOCATIONAL OPTIONS
1. Obtain employment as a Customer Service Representative at a starting
salary of $19,760.
2. Return to work as a Finish Carpenter or Bench Carpenter with annual
earnings ranging from $24.336 up to $33.696.
3. Employment a as First-Line Supervisor/Manager of Construction Trades
Workers with entry level wage of $32.864 up to $45,136.
4. Complete short-term training in Construction Management or General
Contracting for increased earning potential.

9557 South 700 East Suite 100
Sandy, Utah 84070
(801) 572-5633

kfar@xmission.com
fax (801) 545-9422
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METHODOLOGY
The following steps were completed to determine Mr. Ranson's employability:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Interview with Mrs. DiPaolo to obtain background information
Identification of Mr. Ranson's skills and abilities
Identification of jobs where skills and abilities could be used
Identification of the annual number of job openings
Identification of current openings listed with the Department of Workforce
Services
Review of current classified ads in the Salt Lake Tribune.
Identification of potential barriers to employment
Establishment of capacity to produce income based on current skill level and
job opportunities
Estimation of annual earnings

REFERRAL INFORMATION
I was asked to performan an evaluation of employability and earning capacity for Mr.
Kenneth Ranson. Due to the upcoming trial, I was not able to meet with Mr. Ranson
personally, and relied on basic information provided by Mrs. DiPaolo. Using that
information, I completed an analysis of his skills and abilities and research of the
Wasatch Front labor market.

INFORMATION PROVIDED
Mr. Kenneth Ranson is a 54 year-old man who currently resides in Salt Lake City Utah.
ACADEMICS
Mr. Ranson graduated from high school in San Antonio Texas then attended vocational
training in Carpentry. He completed the academic program and supervised work hours
to obtain a Journeyman's License in the state of Texas. He attended one quarter of
school at the University of Texas at Austin in 1978 in general studies and more recently,
two semesters of coursework at the University of Utah.
LICENSES/CERTIFICATIONS
Mr. Ranson possesses a valid drivers' license. In addition, he obtained professional
licensure/certifications as a Journeyman Carpenter in Texas and General Contractor in
Utah.
Journeyman Carpenter - status of license is unknown
Utah General Contractor License (1985), status of license unknown

VOCATIONAL HISTORY
Mr. Ranson is not currently employed. General work history is as follows:

Ranson, Kenneth
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Licensed Journeyman Carpenter beginning in 1974 He worked as a carpenter
remodeling homes in Texas until 1982 when he relocated to Utah.
1982-1986 self-employed Carpenter remodeling homes in the Salt Lake City
area.
Mr. Ranson obtained his General Contractor License in 1986. He drew plans,
obtained permits, supervised subcontractors and completed much of the work on
a personal residence, including most of the finish work.
Since finishing the home, Mr. Ranson has written short stories and a novel,
though none has been published.
Volunteer activities:

School building committee
History and literature lecturer, grade and middle school

MEDICAL HISTORY
Mr. Ranson does not have any medical condition that would interfere with his ability to
work. Current medications include Inderal for atypical headache, Trazodone to aid
sleep, Allopurinol for gout and Zocor for high cholesterol.
KNOWLEDGE. SKILLS AND ABILITIES
Considering his vocational training and past work experience, Mr. Ranson has
specialized knowledge in the following areas:
•

Building and Construction - Knowledge of materials, methods, and the tools
involved in the construction or repair of houses, buildings, or other structures
such as highways and roads.

•

Mechanical - Knowledge of machines and tools, including their designs, uses,
repair, and maintenance.

•

Management of Financial Resources — Determining how money will be spent
to get the work done, and accounting for these expenditures.

•

Building and Construction - Knowledge of materials, methods, and the
appropriate tools to construct objects, structures, and buildings

•

Design - Knowledge of design techniques, principles, tools and instruments
involved in the production and use of precision technical plans, blueprints,
drawings, and models.

Demonstrated skills include:
•

Equipment Selection - Determining the kind of tools and equipment needed to
do a job.

•

Reading Comprehension - Understanding written sentences and paragraphs in
work related documents.

• \w*i i w w t 11 l XWI I I I C U I

Mathematics - Using mathematics to solve problems.
Explosive Strength - The ability to use short bursts of muscle force to propel
oneself (as in jumping or sprinting), or to throw an object.
Information Ordering - The ability to arrange things or actions in a certain order
or pattern according to a specific rule or set of rules (e.g., patterns of numbers,
letters, words, pictures, mathematical operations).
Static Strength - The ability to exert maximum muscle force to lift, push, pull, or
carry objects.
Control Precision - The ability to quickly and repeatedly adjust the controls of a
machine or a vehicle to exact positions.
Deductive Reasoning - The ability to apply general rules to specific problems to
produce'answers that make sense.
Manual Dexterity- The ability to quickly move your hand, your hand together
with your arm, or your two hands to grasp, manipulate, or assemble objects.
Wrist-Finger Speed- The ability to make fast, simple, repeated movements of
the fingers, hands, and wrists.
Inspecting Equipment, Structures, Material- Inspecting or diagnosing
equipment, structures, or materials to identify the causes of errors or other
problems or defects.
Controlling Machines and Processes - Using either control mechanisms or
direct physical activity to operate machines or processes (not including
computers or vehicles).
Evaluating Info. Against Standards - Evaluating information against a set of
standards and verifying that it is correct.
Estimating Needed Characteristics - Estimating the Characteristics of
Materials, Products, Events, or Information: Estimating sizes, distances, and
quantities, or determining time, costs, resources, or materials needed to perform
a work activity.
Judging Qualities of Things, Srvc, People - Making judgments about or
assessing the value, importance, or quality of things or people.
Identifying Objects, Actions, and Events - Identifying information received by
making estimates or categorizations, recognizing differences or similarities, or
sensing changes in circumstances or events.
Implementing Ideas, Programs, etc. - Conducting or carrying out work
procedures and activities in accord with one's own ideas or information provided
through directions/instructions for purposes of installing, modifying, preparing,

delivering, constructing, integrating, finishing, or completing programs, systems,
structures, or products.
•

The ability to direct and coordinate the activities of staff and contract personnel,
and evaluate their performance.

•

The ability to determine labor requirements and recruit workers

•

The ability to direct and supervise workers.

•

The ability to plan, organize, and direct activities concerned with the construction
of structures and systems.

•

The ability to schedule the project in logical steps and budget time required to
meet deadlines.

•

The ability to select, contract, and oversee workers who complete specific pieces
of the project, such as painting or plumbing.

In addition to these job skills, Mr. Ranson is computer literate and familiar with common
computer programs and the internet.
Examples of jobs where these skills, abilities and knowledge are used include:
First-line supervisors/managers of construction trades and extraction workers
Carpenters
Cost Estimators
Cabinetmakers and Bench Carpenters
Customer Service Representatives
Computer Support Specialists

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Based on his demonstrated skills and abilities and transferable skills, possible job
alternatives were identified. In addition, unskilled entry level jobs were considered. The
Utah Non-Metro Occupational Outlook-Statewide and Service Delivery Areas 2002 2012 publication of the Utah Department of Workforce Services presents the official
State of Utah projections of industry and occupational employment and provides labor
market information in the form of labor demand, labor supply and occupational
characteristics. Published in September 2004, this data relies on information gathered
in 2003 wages. Relevant information for the IVletro areas in the state of Utah fc)llows:
ANNUAL ENTRY ANNUAL AVERAGE ANNUAL I
WAGE
JOB
WAGE
WAGE
OPENINGS WAGE
240

$15.80

$21.90

$11.70

$16.10

$14 30

$23.00

Cabinetmakers and Bench Carpenters
Construction Manager

560
80
120
150

$8.80

$11.60

Customer Service Representative

1130

$21 90
$9.10

$34.10
$12.00

Computer Support Specialists

290

$9.50

$14.90 and

First-line supervisors/managers of
construction trades and extraction workers
Carpenters
Cost Estimators

o

Copies of the pages containing this data are provided in Section One.
Other labor market information was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office
of Employment Projections and Utah Department of Workforce Services related to 2003
wages. The percentile rank distributions of wages in the state of Utah for these
positions are as follows:
Pay
i
Period

Job
First-line
supervisors/
Managers

Hourly

Carpenters

2003
10%

25%

$14.75;

|

|

Median

75%

$17.59

$20.75

|

90%

$25.26|

|

$30.121

Yearly

$30,700

$36,600

$43,200

$52,500

$62,600

Hourly

$10.63

$13 34

$16.30

$19.25

$21.37

Yearly

$22,100

$27,700

$33,900

$40,000

$44,400 J

$7.57

$9.31

$10.78

$15.941

Cabinetmakers and
Bench Carpenters

Hourly I
Yearly

$15,700

$19,400

$22,400

$27,200

$33,2001

Construction
Managers

Hourly

$19.33

$22.87

$29.89

$40.14

$48.261

Yearly

$40,200

$47,600

$62,200

$83,500

$100,4001

$16.88

$21.92
$45,600

'

Cost Estimators

Hourly |

$13.04 i

Yearly

$27,100

$35,100

Hourly

$8.37

$10.19

Yearly

$17,400

$21,200

Computer Support 1 Hourly
Specialist
Yearly

$9.47

$10.65

|

Customer
Service Rep

$22,200 [_

$19,700

$13.10;

$29.56 I
$61,500

$77,3001

$16.39

$21.041

$34,100

$43,8001

$12.79 |
$26,600

$37.15 j

$13.36 |

$18.58

$24.36

$27,800 | _ $38,600

$50,700

Wages specific to the Wasatch Front were studied. They are as follows:
Salt Lake City - Ogden Area Wages
Entry
Wage

Occupation Title
First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Construction Trades and
Extraction Workers

^ Q.Q
'

Construction Managers

7

40

i n Si '?

45T280

43,890

45,600
33,330_

Carpenters
Cabinetmakers and Bench[Carpenters

AveraaelMedianl

22,880
71,200~

1

Middle
37770 to 52640

'28170 to 38670

33^570"
2T,650~
64,750

"19440 to24940"
51900 to 83530

Cost Estimators

,34,350

"38340 to 60950

18,740

50,390
25,140

46,490

Customer Service Representatives

23,500

20120 to 27980

Computer Support Specialists

22,960

35,140

32,440

25330 to 42270

Copies of the Occupational Reports for these jobs are provided in Section Two of this
report. The reports contain a brief description, wage information, skills and an example
of current job openings.
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CURRENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES:
Examples of the current job openings listed with the Department of Workforce Services
that are congruent with Mr. Ranson's demonstrated skills and abilities include:
ANNUAL WAGE

JOB TITLE
Foreman/Lead Man
Carpenter
Remodeling Lead Carpenter
Finish Carpenter
Finish Carpenter
Finish Carpenter
Finish Carpenters
Lead Carpenter
Lead Carpenter
Carpenter
Finish Carpenters
Lead Carpenter
Experienced Finish Carpenter
1 Skilled Carpenter
Foreman/Lead Man
Carpenter
Foreman/Lead Man
Lead Carpenter
Estimator Purchaser
Cabinet Makers
Cabinet Makers
Mill Worker
Cabinet Maker
Cabinet Maker
Cabinet Makers/Woodworkers
Cabinet Makers/Woodworkers
Customer Service
Customer Service Opportunities
Technical Support
Help Desk Specialist

1

$17.30-18.50/per hour
$17.30-18.50/perhour
$16-17/per hour
$15-15/per hour
$13-19/per hour
$13-15/per hour
$13-13/per hour
$12.50-17.50/perhour
$12-20/perhour
$12-20/perhour
$12-15/per hour
$12-15/per hour
$12-15/per hour
$12-15/per hour
$16-19/per hour
$16-18/per hour
$19-22/perhour
$13-15/per hour
Not provided
Not Provided
Not Provided
Not Provided
$8-15/per hour
$10-13/per hour
$9-14/perhour
$9-14/per hour
i $10.00-$11.00
i $9.00
| $15.00-$30.00
I $15.01

Copies of these job orders are provided in Section Three.
ADVERTISED JOB OPENINGS
Current job openings compatible with Mr. Ranson's abilities were located in the
classified ads of the recent Sunday Tribune. Examples of the employment opportunities
include:
JOB TITLE

ADVERTISED WAGE

Building Inspector II
Carpentry
Cabinetry
Cabinetry
Cabinetry - Installer
Cabinetry

$15.88-$22.19
$16.00
$9.50
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided

ENTRY WAGE*
$11.80416.208
$11.80-$16.208
$8.50-$11.30*

Ranson, Kenneth

Call Center
Carpenter
Carpenter
Carpenter- Finish
Technical Support Specialist
Technical Support
Computer Tech Support
' Construction Superintendent
Construction Project Manager
Construction - Residential Remodel
Construction - Remodeling
Construction - Superintendent
Customer Service
Technical Customer Service
Customer Service
Customer Sen/ice
Customer Service
Customer Service - Trainee

8
$9.00-$11.00
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
$10.00-$13.00
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided
$10.00-15.00
Not provided
$9.50
$9.50
$9.50
Not provided
Not provided
Not provided

$11.80-$16.208
$11.80-$16.208
$11.80-$16.208
$9.9Q-$15.40*
$9,90-$15.40*

$11.80-$16.208

$9.10-$12.00*
$9.10-$12.00*
$9.10-$12.00*

*based on January 2005 publication

Copies of these ads are provided in Section Four of this report.
MARKETABILITY
.
Mr. Ranson's most marketable skills are in construction trades, however it has been a
number of years since Mr. Ranson worked full time in a competitive position. He would
benefit from professional assistance to learn job seeking skills to locate jobs in the
^ h i d d e n " job market, to develop a resume emphasizing his skills, and to learn interview
skills. Professional assistance is available through private career counselors and the
Department of Workforce Services.
Marketability is determined by an Individual's skills and the Current job market. The
outlook for employment in the various occupations is rated by the Department of Work
Force Services based on employment the demand for workers and wages paid.
Occupations are assigned a star rank based on the projected number of Utah job
openings between 2002 and 2012 and how fast the occupation is expected to grow over
that time period and the median annual wages.
The Utah occupational outlook for Cabinetmakers and Bench Carpenters, Construction
Managers, Customer Service Representatives and Computer Support Technician is
rated three star (out of five), representing a moderate to strong employment outlook and
low to moderate wages.
Cost Estimator, Carpenter and First Line Supervisors/Mangers are rated five star. Fivestar occupations have the strongest employment outlook and high wages.
Labor market research results indicate there are currently a number of advertised job
openings that Mr. Ranson could pursue. With a focused effort, he would probably be
able to locate a full-time position within thirty to forty five days. In the Utah labor market,
the 4.9% rate of unemployment creates a positive market for job seekers.
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Mr. Ranson's ability to locate a suitable job quickly would be enhanced with participation
in employment workshops for job seeking skills, resume writing, interview skills and job
keeping skills. These workshops are offered through the Department of Workforce
Services. Individual assistance is available through private career counselors, the
University of Utah and at times through Community Education programs.

POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT
1. Current inactive labor force status *
2. Lengthy absence from the work forced
3. Lack of job goal and knowledge of labor market opportunities^
These vocational barriers could be minimized through work with a vocational counselor
or job placement specialist to identify jobs compatible with his interests and abilities and
guide vocational exploration to identify realistic options and steps necessary to
formulate a plan to return to work. Salt Lake Community College and the University of
Utah have career placement assistance including vocational testing and counseling
services.
Mr. Ranson has stated to others that he would like to complete a Bachelor's Degree
then pursue graduate education in film studies with a goal of becoming a University
Professor. It is unlikely he could achieve this goal considering his age of 54. Although
he may be able to complete the Bachelor's degree, there is a great deal of competition
for the limited number of seats in graduate programs, where admission is based on
professional achievement as well as academic achievement. Competition for an
academic teaching position is likely to be very keen and it is more likely than not that he
would not be successful in achieving that goal.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering Mr. Ranson's current vocational resources, his options are to obtain
immediate employment in an area of the construction industry as either a carpenter or
as a supervisor or use his computer knowledge and expertise to obtain an entry level
job that would provide opportunities to build a career in computer information
technology or a related area.
Recommendations for Mr. Ranson to begin an efficient job search effort would include
these steps:
•
•
•

Register for work with the Department of Work Force Services to receive
referrals to current job openings.
Complete the skill match form to receive referrals for employment with the state
of Utah.
Attend the free workshops sponsored by the Department of Work Force Services
to learn job seeking techniques, how to write a resume and successful interview
skills.
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•
•

Attend job fairs sponsored through the Department of Work Force Services to
meet potential employers.
Register for work with temporary placement agencies.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on his work experience and the current labor market, Mr. Ranson's minimum
starting salary could be expected to range from $19,760 as a Customer Service
Representative, $24,336 as a Finish Carpenter, up to $32,864 as a First-Line
Supervisor/Manager of Construction Trades Workers. I would expect a steady increase
in earnings once he demonstrates his abilities and develops current work experience.
The conclusions detailed above are based on methodology used and accepted by
Rehabilitation Specialists considered reliable pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael. The conclusions are based on the
information reviewed at the time the report was prepared and any additional or different
information could alter the opinions.
If you have any question regarding this analysis, please let me know.
Best regards,

Xristy Farnsworth, Ph.D.
Diplomate, ABVE
CRC, CVE, CDMS
KF:me
Attachments:
Section One - Utah Metro Occupational Projections 2002 - 2012
Section Two - Occupational Reports
Section Three - Workforce Services Job Orders
Section Four - Tribune Ads
Section Five - Current Resume and List of Cases
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ROBERT DEVIN PUSEY #2665
Attorney for Respondent
Bank of the West Building
140 W. 9000 South, Suite 7
Sandy, UT 84070-2033
Telephone: (801)566-9286
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
KENNETH CLARK RANSON,
Petitioner,
vs.

;)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]
]

MARIANNA DI PAOLO,
Respondent.

])
])

Civil No. 044900818
Judge Joseph C. Fratto
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey

The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court on August 16, 17, 25, and 29, 2005.
Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Bridget K. Romano. Respondent was
present and represented by counsel, Robert D. Pusey. The Court, having received the
stipulations of the parties; having heard the testimony of the witnesses; having reviewed the
exhibits entered into evidence; having fully considered the evidence presented and the
arguments of counsel, and being otherwise fully informed in the premises, hereby enters the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
Jurisdiction and Grounds:
1.

Petitioner and Respondent were each actual and bona fide residents of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah at the time the Verified Complaint for Divorce was filed in this
matter, and each has maintained such residency for more than three months immediately prior
to the commencement of this action.
2.

Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, having married on February

28, 1986 in Salt Lake City, state of Utah.
3.

During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable differences have developed

between the parties, making the continuation of their marriage impossible.
Custody and Parent Time.
4.

Petitioner and Respondent have one minor child born as issue of their

marriage, Sean Ranson, born December 2, 1987. No further children are expected.
5.

The minor child has resided in Salt Lake County for at least six (6) continuous

months and the state of Utah is the child's home state of residency.
6.

Neither party has participated as a party, a witness, or in any other capacity in

litigation concerning custody of the minor child in Utah or any other state.
7.

Neither party has knowledge of any custody proceeding concerning the minor

child in any other court of Utah or any other state or of any person not a party to this action
who has physical custody of the child or who claims to have custody or parent time rights to
the child.
2

8.

Neither party has applied for or received public assistance for themselves or

the minor child therefore the State of Utah need not be joined to this action.
9.

Petitioner and Respondent shall be awarded joint legal and physical custody of

Sean Ranson.
10.

The Court cannot legally award either party parent time with the minor child

after December 2, 2005, the child's eighteenth birthday.
11.

Upon attaining legal majority, Sean Ranson may determine how he will share

time with Petitioner and Respondent and the court therefore declines to address the parties'
respective requests regarding the 2006 Easter and spring break periods.
12.

The Court denies Petitioner's request to "flip" the present parent time schedule

and to award to Petitioner that end of the schedule Respondent has enjoyed, and vice versa.
13.

The Court finds, instead, that until Sean Ranson attains the age of 18 on

December 2, 2005, Petitioner and Respondent shall share parent time with the child on an
equal basis and shall alternate parent time on weekly basis, from Sunday evening to Sunday
evening.
14.

Said schedule shall commence immediately, with Petitioner having the first

full week of parent time.
15.

Petitioner and Respondent shall alternate holiday parent time on an equal basis

and shall alternate every other holiday as set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35 until
Sean attains the age of 18 on December 2, 2005. Said holiday timesharing shall commence
on Labor Day, September 2, 2005, which holiday time shall belong to Respondent.
3

Child Support.
16.

Petitioner is presently unemployed and it is reasonable to impute income to

him in the amount $32,000 per year, or $2,666.66 gross monthly income. Respondent is
employed at the University of Utah and earns $78,300 per year, or $6,525 gross monthly
income. Effective September 1, 2005, Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the
amount of $171 per month as set forth in the Child Support Worksheet attached as Exhibit A
hereto. Child support shall be payable on the 5th and 20th day of each month and shall
continue until the minor child graduates from high school in his normal expected year.
17.

The parties' shall pay the child's education-related expenses, including private

school tuition, books and fees in the approximate amount of $15,000, from the parties' ETrade Money Market Account.
Health Needs of the Child.
18.

So long as child support is due, each party shall obtain and maintain health,

hospitalization, dental, orthodontic, optical and eye-care, counseling and treatment, mental
health, prescription drug and any other medical and dental insurance coverage for the benefit
of Sean Ranson whenever it is available to him or her through employment at reasonable cost.
19.

In the event of a conflict between the parties relative to insurance coverage, the

Court shall consider the reasonableness of the cost of each plan and the availability of group
coverage.
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20.

Petitioner and Respondent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the

premium actually paid by a party for the dependent child's portion of insurance, which
expense shall be added to or deducted from the base amount of child support. The child's
portion of the premium expenses shall be deemed the per capita share of the premium actually
paid by a party.
21.

Petitioner and Respondent shall share equally all uninsured medical, dental,

hospitalization, dental, orthodontic, optical and eye-care, counseling and treatment, mental
health, prescription drug, and any other related expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the dependent child and actually paid by the parties.
22.

The parties shall cooperate to exchange all claim forms and statements

received from or by insurance companies in an effort to coordinate the payment of such
expenses and consistent with Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.15, each party who carries
J

insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the other upon initial enrollment of the
child, and thereafter on or before December 1 of each year. Each party who maintains
insurance coverage shall notify the other of any change of insurance carrier, premium or
benefit within thirty (30) calendar days of the date the party knew or the change.
23.

Each party who incurs medical, dental, hospitalization, dental, orthodontic,

optical and eye-care, counseling and treatment, mental health, prescription drug, and any
other related expenses, including deductibles and co-payments for the child shall provide
written verification of the expense to the other within sixty (60) days of payment. A party
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who fails to comply with this provision may be denied the right to receive credit or to recover
the other parent's share of the expense.
Dependency Tax Exemption.
24.

Respondent shall be awarded the right to claim the minor child as a

dependency exemption on her state and federal income tax returns each year.
Real Property.
25.

During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired an interest in a building

lot and residence located at 2096 East 10095 South, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which
real property the parties agree has a market value of $176,500.
26.

The Court finds the parties purchased the building lot as a joint venture and

with use of investment income and earnings Petitioner deposited into joint checking accounts
and income and earnings Respondent deposited into joint checking accounts.
27.

The Court finds the parties commingled their income and earnings in these

joint checking accounts and paid all of their bills and expenses related to their general upkeep
and maintenance, and related to the purchase of the lot, from the above-referenced joint
checking accounts.
2£.

The Court finds no sufficient legal or equitable basis to grant Petitioner's

request to reserve to him the sum of $21,000 from the value of the marital home for
Petitioner's claimed purchase of the building lot and therefore denies that request.
29.

Petitioner shall be awarded the martial residence located at 2096 East 10095

South as his sole and separate property, free and clear of any claim by Respondent.
6

Respondent shall immediately execute and deliver to Petitioner a Quit Claim Deed in
Petitioner's favor upon entry of a final Decree of Divorce.
Personal Property.
30.

During the course of the marriage, Petitioner and Respondent have acquired a

number of items of personal property. The parties have previously, generally divided their
personal property in a fair and equitable fashion.
31.

Petitioner and Respondent shall be awarded as his or her sole and separate

property all items of real property currently found in his or her respective name, or in his or
her respective possession, except as more specifically designated below:
TO PETITIONER:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Olympus digital camera;
Petitioner's Army uniform;
Petitioner's past school papers;
Petitioner's personal files, to include his apprenticeship and journeyman
certificates, if Respondent has them;
Tohono O'odham basket nos. 1,4 and 5, ranked accordingly to size of
opening, with 1 being the largest;
1 set of crystal wineglasses; and
1992 Honda Accord vehicle.

TO RESPONDENT:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Antique electric typewriter;
Grandfather's garden tools;
Childhood dresser (currently in use by minor child);
Brother's antique highchair;
Handles to maple buffet;
Respondent's employment files;
Antique canning jars;
Petitioner's family Christmas ornaments;
Tohono O'odham basket nos. 2 and 3 ranked accordingly to size of opening,
with 1 being the largest; and
7

10.

2002 Subaru Outback vehicle.

Bank and Depository Accounts.
32.

Petitioner and Respondent shall each be awarded his or her own bank and

depository accounts.
Investment Accounts.
33.

During the course of the marriage, Petitioner and Respondent acquired an

interest in certain investment accounts, including two E*Trade accounts currently valued at
the approximate amount of $180,000.
34.

The parties shall pay the costs related to the minor child's private school

tuition and bundled billing in the approximate amount of $15,000 prior to dividing between
themselves their investment funds.
35.

Petitioner shall then be awarded the sum of $5,265 as a concession for the

disparity in the value of the vehicles awarded the respective parties in paragraph no. 31 above.
36.

Thereafter, Petitioner and Respondent shall each be awarded one-half of all

remaining interest in the investment funds accrued in the E*Trade accounts set out above.
37.

Petitioner shall direct the division of these accounts immediately upon entry of

a final Decree of Divorce by awarding to each party an equal number of shares of each age
class and issue of stock, so that the total value, tax burden and type of stock are equalized.
When an odd number of shares exist in any lot, the additional odd share shall be divided on an
alternating basis as the stock appears on the E-Trade account report, with Petitioner to receive
the first additional share.
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Retirement Benefits.
38.

Both before and during the course of the parties' marriage, Respondent

accrued certain retirement benefits through her employment at the University of Utah through
her TIAA and CREF accounts, which have an approximate value of $296,968.
39.

Respondent shall be awarded her separate, premarital interest in these

retirement benefits in the amount of $21,500 and shall be awarded the additional sum of
$176,500 from these retirement benefits to provide parity pursuant to Petitioner's receipt of
the parties' marital residence in paragraph no. 29 above.
40.

Petitioner and Respondent shall each be awarded one-half of the remaining

retirement benefits in the approximate amount of $98,968, which one-half interests shall be
adjusted by any earnings or losses accruing from the date of valuation on or about June 30,
2005 through the date of actual distribution.
41.

Petitioner's interests in these TIAA and CREF plans shall be secured by a

Qualified Domestic Relations Order prepared by Petitioner's counsel and subject to approval
as to form by Respondent's counsel.
Debts and Obligations.
42.

Petitioner and Respondent have no remaining or known joint debts or

obligations.
43.

Petitioner and Respondent shall separately assume, be responsible for,

indemnify and hold the other harmless from any and all debts and/or obligations incurred by
him or her or in his or her sole and separate name or for his or her separate benefit.
9

Alimony.
44.

This Court finds alimony is neither an annuity nor a penalty, but is designed to

assist one spouse in terms of a need for financial assistance.
45.

The Court finds further it may make and enter an alimony award pursuant to

Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(8) and the factors set forth therein, which factors include: 1)
the financial condition of the requesting spouse; 2) the financial need of the requesting
spouse; 3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 4) the ability of the
requesting spouse to provide for his or her own support.
46.

The Court finds Petitioner's financial condition as follows:
a.

Petitioner is presently unemployed and enrolled as a full-time

student at the University of Utah;
b.

Petitioner receives a small income from his independent land

investments;
c.

Petitioner receives a small income from his security

investments;
d.

As agreed herein, Petitioner shall be awarded the marital

residence, which has a market value of $176,500 and no related mortgage
indebtedness;
e.

As agreed herein, Petitioner shall be awarded cash in the

approximate amount of $85,000;
f.

Petitioner has no automobile payment; and
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g.

Petitioner has no consumer debt but has "other debt" in the form

of loan to Petitioner from his mother in the approximate amount of $39,000,
which debt is not supported by a contract or note and which loan was made to
Petitioner by his mother contingent upon Petitioner's ability to repay the same.
47.

The Court finds Petitioner's financial needs are more problematic to articulate

and the Court must take into account the parties' "standard of living."
48.

The Court refuses to consider or to factor in Petitioner's "one time" expenses

or expenses which will come to a quick end following entry of a final decree; namely,
Petitioner's repayment of the loan from his mother and his payment of attorney fees related to
this matter.
49.

The Court likewise refuses to consider Petitioner's expenses that are

attributable to a third person.
50.

The Court refuses to factor in or to consider any education or tuition expenses,

whether they are incurred by Petitioner or on behalf of the minor child.
51.

The Court must evaluate Petitioner's "ongoing" expenses in order to properly

evaluate his "standard of living" which expenses include Petitioner's monthly and ongoing
insurance, food, clothing, and entertainment expenses and the like.
52.

The Court finds Petitioner to have reasonable monthly need in the amount of

53.

The Court finds Respondent possesses the ability to pay the amount of $2,500

$2,500.

in and for Petitioner's support.
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54.

Upon the testimony and evidence adduced by Petitioner and Respondent at

trial and upon the testimony of Dr. Kristy Farnsworth, the Court finds employment is
available to Petitioner at the rate of $32,000 per year.
55.

The Court rejects Petitioner's testimony that his age prohibits him from

earning income at this level.
56.

The court rejects Petitioner's claim that his health, which includes ocular

migraines and adverse medication reactions, renders Petitioner unemployable or unable to
earn income at the rate of $32,000 per year.
57.

The Court is not convinced Petitioner's health problems adversely impact his

ability to be employed.
58.

The Court finds Petitioner is underemployed and that he possesses the ability

to produce an income for his own self-support.
59.

Upon the foregoing, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that

Petitioner is able to support himself and to enjoy gross annual income of $32,000, or gross
monthly income in the amount of $2,666. Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner is able to
meet his own monthly needs and therefore an award of permanent alimony is not warranted.
60.

The Court declines to award Petitioner any sum in and for rehabilitative

alimony.
61.

The Court also finds upon the testimony of Dr. Farnsworth, Petitioner may

experience of transition period of up to 90 days before he is able to realize income equal to
$32,000 per year.
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62.

However, the Court finds that given the fact Petitioner has been awarded cash

in the amount of $85,000 and a home valued at $176,500, Petitioner has sufficient assets to
draw upon and therefore declines to award Petitioner any time as a transition period.
63.

Accordingly, no alimony is awarded to Petitioner.

Attorney Fees.
64.

Each party shall assume and pay his or her own attorney fees and costs

incurred in this matter.
Disclosure.
65.

Should either party discover the existence of undisclosed property, the other

shall be entitled to receive an equal portion of such property.
Cooperation.
66.

Petitioner and Respondent shall cooperate in clearing title or in transferring

assets to accomplish the purpose and intent of these Findings. Each party shall execute any
and all documents necessary to carry out the terms of the Decree of Divorce immediately
upon execution and entry of the same.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this

2.

Petitioner shall be awarded a Decree of Divorce from Respondent upon the

action.

grounds of irreconcilable differences, said Decree to be absolute and final upon entry.
3.

The Decree of Divorce shall conform to the Findings of Fact made herein.
13
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ROBERT DEVIN PUSEY #2665
Attorney for Respondent
Bank of the West Building
140 W. 9000 South, Suite 7
Sandy, UT 84070-2033
Telephone: (801) 566-9286
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

KENNETH CLARK RANSON,
Petitioner,
vs.

])
]
]>

MARJANNA DI PAOLO,
Respondent.

DECREE OF DIVORCE

;)

Civil No. 044900818
Judge Joseph C. Fratto
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey

]

The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court on August 16, 17, 25, and 29, 2005.
Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Bridget K. Romano. Respondent was
present and represented by counsel, Robert D. Pusey. The Court, having received the
stipulations of the parties; having heard the testimony of the witnesses; having reviewed the
exhibits entered into evidence; and the arguments of counsel; and having previously entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:

Decree of Divorce.
1.

Petitioner Kenneth Clark Ranson is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from

respondent Marianna Di Paolo on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, such decree to*
become final upon signing, entry and the determination of the Court.
Custody and Parent Time.
2.

Petitioner and Respondent have one minor child born as issue of their

marriage, Sean Ranson, born December 2, 1987. No further children are expected.
3.

Petitioner and Respondent shall be awarded joint legal and physical custody of

Sean Ranson.
4.

Upon attaining legal majority on December 2, 2005, Sean Ranson may

determine how he will share time with Petitioner and Respondent and the court therefore
declines to address the parties' respective requests regarding the 2006 Easter and spring break
periods.
5.

Petitioner and Respondent shall share parent time with Sean Ranson on an

equal basis and shall alternate parent time on a weekly basis, from Sunday evening to Sunday
evening, until the child attains the age of 18 on December 2, 2005.
6.

Said schedule shall commence immediately, with Petitioner having the first

full week of parent time.
7.

Petitioner and Respondent shall alternate holiday parent time on an equal basis

and shall alternate every other holiday as set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35 until
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Sean attains the age of 18 on December 2, 2005. Said holiday timesharing shall commence
on Labor Day, September 2, 2005, which holiday time shall belong to Respondent.
Child Support.
8.

Petitioner is presently unemployed and it is reasonable to impute income to

him in the amount $32,000 per year, or $2,666.66 gross monthly income. Respondent is
employed at the University of Utah and earns $78,300 per year, or $6,525 gross monthly
income. Effective September 1, 2005, Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the
amount of $171 per month as set forth in the Child Support Worksheet attached as Exhibit A
hereto. Child support shall be payable on the 5th and 20th day of each month and shall
continue until the minor child graduates from high school in his normal expected year.
9.

The parties' shall pay the child's education-related expenses, including private

school tuition, books and fees in the approximate amount of $15,000, from the parties' ETrade Money Market Account.
Health Needs of the Child.
10.

So long as child support is due, each party shall obtain and maintain health,

hospitalization, dental, orthodontic, optical and eye-care, counseling and treatment, mental
health, prescription drug and any other medical and dental insurance coverage for the benefit
of Sean Ranson whenever it is available to him or her through employment at reasonable cost.
11.

In the event of a conflict between the parties relative to insurance coverage,

the Court shall consider the reasonableness of the cost of each plan and the availability of
group coverage.
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12.

Petitioner and Respondent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the

premium actually paid by a party for the dependent child's portion of insurance, which
expense shall be added to or deducted from the base amount of child support. The child's
portion of the premium expenses shall be deemed the per capita share of the premium actually
paid by a party.
13.

Petitioner and Respondent shall share equally all uninsured medical, dental,

hospitalization, dental, orthodontic, optical and eye-care, counseling and treatment, mental
health, prescription drug, and any other related expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the dependent child and actually paid by the parties.
14.

The parties shall cooperate to exchange all claim forms and statements

received from or by insurance companies in an effort to coordinate the payment of such
expenses and consistent with Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.15, each party who carries
insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the other upon initial enrollment of the
child, and thereafter on or before December 1 of each year. Each party who maintains
insurance coverage shall notify the other of any change of insurance carrier, premium or
benefit within thirty (30) calendar days of the date the party knew or the change.
15.

Each party who incurs medical, dental, hospitalization, dental, orthodontic,

optical and eye-care, counseling and treatment, mental health, prescription drug, and any
other related expenses, including deductibles and co-payments for the child shall provide
written verification of the expense to the other within sixty (60) days of payment. A party
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who fails to comply with this provision may be denied the right to receive credit or to recover
the other parent's share of the expense.
Dependency Tax Exemption.
16.

Respondent shall be awarded the right to claim the minor child as a

dependency exemption on her state and federal income tax returns each year.
Real Property.
17.

Petitioner shall be awarded the martial residence located at 2096 East 10095

South as his sole and separate property, free and clear of any claim by Respondent.
Respondent shall immediately execute and deliver to Petitioner a Quit Claim Deed in
Petitioner's favor upon entry of a final Decree of Divorce.
Personal Property.
18.

Petitioner and Respondent shall be awarded as his or her sole and separate

property all items of real property currently found in his or her respective name, or in his or
her respective possession, except as more specifically designated below:
TO PETITIONER:
, 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Olympus digital camera;
Petitioner's Army uniform;
Petitioner's past school papers;
Petitioner's personal files, to include his apprenticeship and journeyman
certificates if Respondent has them;
Tohono O'odham basket nos. 1, 4 and 5, ranked accordingly to size of
opening, with 1 being the largest;
1 set of crystal wineglasses; and
1992 Honda Accord vehicle.
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TO RESPONDENT:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Antique electric typewriter;
Grandfather's garden tools;
Childhood dresser (currently in use by minor child);
Brother's antique highchair;
Handles to maple buffet;
Respondent's employment files;
Antique canning j ars;
Petitioner's family Christmas ornaments;
Tohono O'odham basket nos. 2 and 3 ranked accordingly to size of opening,
with 1 being the largest; and

10.

2002 Subaru Outback vehicle.

Bank and Depository Accounts.
19.

Petitioner and Respondent shall each be awarded his or her own bank and

depository accounts.
Investment Accounts.
20.

During the course of the marriage, Petitioner and Respondent acquired an

interest in certain investment accounts, including two E*Trade accounts currently valued at
the approximate amount of $180,000.
21.

The parties shall pay the costs related to the minor child's private school

tuition and bundled billing in the approximate amount of $15,000 prior to dividing between
themselves their investment funds.
22.

Petitioner shall then be awarded the sum of $5,265 as a concession for the

disparity in the value of the vehicles awarded the respective parties in paragraph no. 18 above.
23.

Thereafter, Petitioner and Respondent shall each be awarded one-half of all

remaining interest in the investment funds accrued in the E*Trade accounts set out above.
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24.

Petitioner shall direct the division of these accounts immediately upon entry of

a final Decree of Divorce by awarding to each party an equal number of shares of each age
class and issue of stock, so that the total value, tax burden and type of stock are equalized.
When an odd number of shares exist in any lot, the additional odd share shall be divided on an
alternating basis as the stock appears on the E-Trade account report, with Petitioner to receive
the first additional share.
Retirement Benefits.
25.

Both before and during the course of the parties' marriage, Respondent

accrued certain retirement benefits through her employment at the University of Utah through
her TIAA and CREF accounts, which have an approximate value of $296,968.
26.

Respondent shall be awarded her separate, premarital interest in these

retirement benefits in the amount of $21,500 and shall be awarded the additional sum of
$176,500 from these retirement benefits to provide parity pursuant to Petitioner's receipt of
the parties' marital residence in paragraph no. 17 above.
27.

Petitioner and Respondent shall each be awarded one-half of the remaining

retirement benefits in the approximate amount of $98,968, which one-half interests shall be
adjusted by any earnings or losses accruing from the date of valuation on or about June 30,
2005 through the date of actual distribution.
28.

Petitioner's interests in these TIAA and CREF plans shall be secured by a

Qualified Domestic Relations Order prepared by Petitioner's counsel and subject to approval
as to form by Respondent's counsel.
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Debts and Obligations.
29.

Petitioner and Respondent have no remaining or known joint debts or

obligations.
30.

Petitioner and Respondent shall separately assume, be responsible for,

indemnify and hold the other harmless from any and all debts and/or obligations incurred by
him or her or in his or her sole and separate name or for his or her separate benefit.
Alimony.
31.

No alimony is awarded to Petitioner.

Attorney Fees.
32.

Each party shall assume and pay his or her own attorney fees and costs

incurred in this matter.
Disclosure.
33.

Should either party discover the existence of undisclosed property, the other

shall be entitled to receive an equal portion of such property.
Cooperation.
34.

Petitioner and Respondent shall cooperate in clearing title or in transferring

assets to accomplish the purpose and intent of this Decree of Divorce. Each party shall
execute any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms of this Decree of Divorce
immediately upon execution and entry of the same.

8

